US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

452 Amphibians Came To Conquer
The Commandant returned it to CINCPAC and sent COMINCH a copy of
his reply and of the basic letter and previous endorsements.
COMSOPAC approved the organization of a provisional Raider Battalion
from the 2nd Marines, but disapproved it for the 7th and 8th Marines.
CINCPAC disapproved the basic recommendation that Raider Battalions
be integral units of Marine Regiments, and indicated that the organization
of a provisional Raider Battalion should be undertaken only in case of “due
necessity.”
The Commandant of the Marine Corps agreed with CINCPAC. He re-
ported that as a result of recommendations from the Naval forces in the
field, two additional Raider Battalions were being organized and added that:
Steps have been taken to intensify training of all units destined for the
South Pacific for the type of operations being conducted there.
The Commandant noted, with regret, that the basic letter did
not contain the views of the Commanding General 1st Marine Division in a
matter in which he is particularly qualified, and concerned. w
Without ever having discussed this matter with Admiral Turner, since he
died before it was researched, the author can only guess as to whether there
was any background reason for this unsuccessful foray into Marine organiza-
tional matters. But an earnest belief that the Japanese could be dislodged
from their various placements in the Lower Solomons by landings in their
rear, perhaps played a part. Before the initial WATCHTOWER landings,
Major General Vandegrift had concurred in such a plan.
Rear Admiral Turner received strong support in his concept of using
Marines in flanking operations or taking the enemy in the rear, rather than
in frental attacks when, in November 1942, Admiral King addressed a
message to COMSOPAC which contained the following:
The final decision canceling the Aola Bay project brings to climax my
uneasiness lest we continue to use up our strength in virtual frontal attacks
such as now involved in expulsion of enemy from Guadalcanal.
Admiral King suggested that the Marines could be more profitably em-
ployed in a flanking operation in which the Marines would seize the base,
where the enemy had an airfield, and from where he was currently operating
in support of Guadalcanal.s’
“,(a) Commandant, Marine Corps, letter, 003A/27642, 3 Oct. 1942; (b) COMSOPAC, letter,
Ser 0094b, 6 Sep. 1942; (c) CINCPAC, letter, Ser 0208 of 24 Sep. 1942.
‘4COMINCH to COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, 301915 NOV. 1942.