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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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304 Amphibians Came To Conquer<br />

little amplification by you. It is expected, however, that you will exercise such<br />

direction as you may consider necessary when changed or unforeseen situations<br />

arise. . . .48<br />

Vice Admiral Ghormley, on 9 May 1942, spelled out his understanding<br />

of this directive in considerable detail in the very excellent COMSOPAC<br />

War Diary as follows:<br />

<strong>The</strong> Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet would order Task Force Commanders<br />

to report to the Commander South Pacific Force for duty. <strong>The</strong><br />

Commander South Pacific Force would direct the Task Force Commander to<br />

carry out his mission (as given by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet).<br />

<strong>The</strong> Commander South Pacific Force would not interfere in the Task Force<br />

Commander’s mission unless circumstances, presumably not known to the<br />

Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, indicated that specific measures were required<br />

to be performed by the Task Force Commander. <strong>The</strong> Commander<br />

South Pacific Force would then direct the Task Force Commanders to take<br />

such measures.4g<br />

It is certainly deducible from this, that if COMSOPAC felt he had only<br />

limited authority to interfere in the broad mission, then he had even less<br />

authority to interfere in how the mission was carried out tactically.<br />

This CINCPAC directive apparently was so firmly in Vice Admiral<br />

Ghormley’s mind that when the despatch version of the WATCHTOWER<br />

directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived on the Fourth of July 1942,<br />

stating that COMINCH assumed Ghormley would command in person in<br />

the operating area, he still did not visualize himself as an operational<br />

commander exercising the full range of command authority in an operating<br />

area. This was so even though the word “command” had b?en used by<br />

COMINCH without limiting adjectives and therefore included “the<br />

direction, coordination, and control of military forces.” 50<br />

Admiral Nimitz’s despatch of 9 July that COMSOPAC would exercise<br />

“strategic command in person” was certainIy a modification of the basic<br />

CINCPAC 9 May directive to COMSOPAC, but it was also a modification<br />

of the CINCPAC despatch of 27 June telling COMINCH that ‘lGhormley<br />

will be placed in full command of operation. ” 51 <strong>The</strong> use of the words<br />

“strategic command” by Admiral Nimitz could have been interpreted as<br />

a warning not to step into the immediate tactical field, and certainly left no<br />

mCINCPAC, Instructions to Prospective COMSOPAC, Ser 09000 of 12 May 1942.<br />

“ COMSOPAC War Diary, 9 May 1942.<br />

mJoint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joivt Usage(Washington:<br />

Government Printing Office, 1960).<br />

‘1CINCPAC to COMINCH, 272251 Jun. 1942.

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