US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

208 Atnpbibians Came To Conquer
Turner learned that there were two prerequisites for a successful amphibious
operation:
1. Secure lines of communications to the area of conflict.
2. Command of the sea and air around the objective.
If these two basic conditions could be satisfied, then it was essential to:
a. select landing areas with both hydrographic conditions favorable to
the Navy and terrain conditions favorable to the Marines or Army
troops.
b. deceive the enemy as to the chosen areas of debarkation as long as
possible.
c. by air bomb and naval gun fire prepare the landing area, so the
troops could prepare to seize them with confidence.
Once the troops landed and seized the beachhead it would be necessary to:
a. land artillery rapidly, and to secure any high ground commanding
the beachheads so as to permit a quick shore-side build up of
logistic support.
And one could then look forward to:
b. an early transfer of the conflict from amphibious to land warfare.
All this and much more was set forth in Fleet Tactical Publication No.
167, the Bible of Landing Operations Doctrine published by the United
States Navy in 1941.
THE NAVY ORGANIZES SHORESIDE FOR THE
AMPHIBIOUS TASK AHEAD
Prior to June 1942, there were no distinctive “amphibious ships and craft”
sub-sections in the various divisions of Naval Operations, except in the
Fleet Training Division. Up to that time, amphibious matters were handled
by the various “Auxiliary vessels” sub-sections.”
On 24 February 1940, there were only 35 personnel landing boats in the
whole Navy built for that purpose and these were of the 30-foot type. On
this same date there were 5 tank lighters and 6 artillery lighters. However,
the following extract from a report from the Joint Planning Committee to
the Joint Board and jointly signed by R. K. Turner and L. T. Gerow showed
the vastly improved status on 30 September 1941:
“ CNO Organizational Rosters, 1941–1942.