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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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284 Anzphzbz~nJ Came To Conquer<br />

indication of how very busy they were is that no July or August 1942 War<br />

Diary for the ship survives in any of the depositories, and it seems probable<br />

it never was forwarded.<br />

Although the 13,00@ton McCaw/ey had been the Grace Line’s passenger<br />

ship Santa Barbara for some years, and presumably had more than adequate<br />

living accommodations for any naval purpose, this did not prove the case.<br />

Staff officers of the rank of lieutenant commander were crowded together<br />

three in a room, and the more junior ship and communication officers were<br />

stacked up in bunk rooms. <strong>The</strong> McCaw/ey, as one of the 13 transports<br />

designated for WATCHTOWER, had to carry her share of troops and the<br />

boats to land them. This task absorbed communication facilities needed by<br />

the Amphibious Commander.<br />

Of the PHIBFORSOPAC Staff, only the serologist filed a “satisfactory”<br />

report on the particular flagship facilities needed for his efficient func-<br />

tioning.g<br />

PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER<br />

In his San Francisco Memorandum to CINCPAC, Rear Admiral Turner<br />

bluntly stated that “neither the troops, ships, nor aircraft assigned to this<br />

project are adequately trained in amphibious warfare.” <strong>The</strong> Commanding<br />

General of the Amphibious <strong>Corps</strong>, Pacific Fleet, had reported recently:<br />

<strong>The</strong> state of readiness of the First <strong>Marine</strong> Aircraft Wing is such that it is<br />

considered imperative that steps be taken immediately to remedy the situation.<br />

However, Rear Admiral Turner believed that “there is s@cient time to<br />

remedy training deficiencies provided corrective steps are taken at once.” 10<br />

To initiate the corrective steps, he attached to his memorandum to CINCPAC<br />

a prospective training schedule. This schedule included landing <strong>Marine</strong>s<br />

during an actual gun and air bombardment, conducted by the aircraft,<br />

heavy cruisers, and destroyers slated to support the initial landings and controlled<br />

by air controllers and shore fire control parties from these ships.<br />

‘ (a) Interviews and questionnaires from PHIBFORSOPAC Staff, 1961–1963. Hereafter<br />

PHIBFORSOPAC Staff Interviews; (b) A.C.W. Baskin, tetter, 16 Nov. 1962.<br />

10(a) PESTILENCE Memo, para. 2; (b) Commanding General, 1st <strong>Marine</strong> Aircraft Wing,<br />

Pacific Fleet, to Commander Amphibious Force, pacific Fleet, letter, KVIO/A16/CSN-082 of 11<br />

May 1942 and First Endorsement thereon by Commanding Gmeral, Amphibious <strong>Corps</strong>, Pacific<br />

Fleet, 13 May 1942. This was the Wing whose forward erhelon landed on Henderson Field, 20<br />

August 1942.

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