US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

WATCHTOWER 255
at Bougainvillea in the Northern Solomons. A Tulagi Invasion Group
equipped for setting up a seaplane base at Tulagi Island in the Southern
Solomons landed there on 3 May 1942. This forward movement put the
Japanese almost astride the direct sea route from Hawaii to northern
Australia. It also put the planners on COMINCH Staff, who were particu-
larly concerned with the SOPAC area, in the jumping up and down stage.
But it was to be 60 days and 60 nights more before the Joint Chiefs could
agree on a directive governing counter-offensive movements in the SOPAC-
SOWESPAC Area.
And, Admiral King, on the day before the President said ‘‘1 do not want
BOLERO slowed down,” was outlining to the Joint Chiefs the reasons for
doing more to meet the vital military needs of the United States in the
Pacific. He wrote:
MEMORANDUM TO ]OINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF
Subject: J.C.S. 48. Defense of Island Bases in the Pacific
1. In paragraph 5 of the memorandum from the Joint Planners forming
a Paft of J.C.S. 48, the statement appears; ‘The Army members of the J.P.S.
are reluctant to recommend any increase in aviation in the Pacific Area at this
time due to the fact that any increase in this area means not only a corresponding
decrease in the main effort but also an inordinate delay in its initiation.’
I agree that there must be no undue delay in the deployment of available
forces in the main effort; but I am not in agreement with the recommendation
that forces in the Pacific be kept at a bare minimum.
2. The Pacific Theater is an area for which the United States bears full
strategic responsibility. The recent Japanese successes in Burma, added to
previous successes, leave the Japanese free to choose any new line of action
they see fit, including an attack in force on Australia, on the Australia-Hawaii
line of communications, on Hawaii or on Alaska. Even now they are massing
strong land, sea, and air forces in the Mandate Area beyond our range of
observation. *
3. The basic strategic plan on which we are now operating is to hold in
the Pacific. I am not convinced that the forces now there or allocated to that
theater are sufficient to “hold” against a determined attack in force by the
Japanese, an attack which they can initiate very soon. The mounting of
BOLERO must not be permitted to interfere with our vital needs in the
Pacific. I am not convinced that the Japanese are going to allow us to ‘hold’
but are going to drive and drive hard.
4. The disastrous consequences which would result if we are unable to
hold the present position in the Pacific Areas are self-evident. We have
already seen, in the Far East and in Burma, the results of being ‘spread out
too thin;’ we must not commit the same error in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
5. Important as the mounting of BOLERO may be, the Pacific problem is