US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

360 Amphibians Came To Conqner
and the reviewing ot%cer on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
for the Admiral Hepburn Investigative Report gave more detail on the
administrative action. He later was Judge Advocate General of the Navy and
then a Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy. His review was passed on and concurred
in by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral W. R. Purnell, later Vice
Admiral, U. S. Navy, and the Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards,
later Admiral, U.S. Navy.
In this review, Captain Russell pointed out that:
(a) Vice Admiral Ghormley, who was head man in the area, and therefore
answerable for the operation, was relieved not long afterward. Regardless of
the. fact that no reason for his change of duty was announced, there was a
stigma attached to it, with everything indicating that he was relieved because
of this defeat. . . .
(b) Admiral Hepburn mentions the failure of Rear Admiral McCain to
search out the area in which the Japs must have been, after Rear Admiral
Turner, in effect, asked him to do so, but apparently does not feel that he
should be called to account for it. . . .
(c) Admiral Hepburn gives Admiral Turner pretty much a clean bill of
health.
(d) Vice Admiral Fletcher and Rear Admiral Noyes have been relieved of
their commands. Again no reason has been assigned, but the inference is that
the latter, at least, has been tried and found wanting. In other words, something
has already been done, administratively.
*****
It does not necessarily follow that because we took a beating somebody
must be the goat. . . to me it is more of an object lesson in how not to fight,
than it is a failure for which someone should hang. . . .“
The two-volume Naval War College analysis, in its 23 pages of “Battle
Lessons,” mentions no personalities, but some of the biting “Lessons” apply
directly to specific actions of specific command personalities. There are 26
Lessons. One of these was pertinent to Rear Admiral Turner personally.
Nearly all of them are pertinent to every naval officer exercising command
in the nuclear age, as well as in World War II, and several will be mentioned
later in the chapter.
THE PRIMARY CAUSE—INADEQUATE AND
FAULTY AIR RECONNAISSANCE
Admiral Turner, when asked, in 1960, if he would name “the primary
n Hepburn Report Vol. I, no ser of 13 May 1943, Memorandum for Admiral, 31 Jul. 1943,
attached by Reviewing Oflicer.