US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

HUDDLE Slowly Sczzttled 439
On 15 August COMINCH transmitted a despatch from the Joint Chiefs
to COMSOPAC (which COMPHIBFORSOPAC also received) containing
these words:
based upon the successful progress of Task One, it should be practicable to
mount immediately that part of Task Two. . . . CINCPAC urges such
actions. . . .ll
It was apparent from this despatch that at the JCS, COMINCH, and
CINCPAC level, it was anticipated that Task One, a major part of which
was HUDDLE, would be successfully completed.
On 17 August COMSOPAC informed CINCPAC and COMINCH that
Ndeni “will be occupied as soon as practicable.” ‘z
On 20 August 1942, Rear Admiral Turner at Noumea, issued his second
Op Plan for the occupation and defense of Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Islands.13
He was in a vise. His immediate seniors, Nimitz and Ghormley, were
urging him to get on with HUDDLE. His immediate Marine junior (Vandegrift)
was urging him to scuttle HUDDLE.
That, at this date, Turner was just a bit on the fence is apparent from
the fact that his Op Plan A9–42 was delivered to those who had tasks to plan
and to do if the operation was carried out, but the copies for COMINCH,
Naval Operations, the Commanding General First Marine Division, and
others were marked: “Deferred Distribution (After execution of Plan) .“
The deferred distribution of Op Plan A9-42 was never made.
On 23 August, Rear Admiral Turner informed Major General Vandegrift:
The present plan is to send this regiment (i’th) plus Fifth Defense Battalion
(less your share) to Ndeni as a garrison, but of course that will be changed,
if it becomes necessary .14
On 28 August 1942, by agreement between Rear Admirals McCain and
Turner, Lieutenant Colonel Weir, the Assistant Operations Officer (Air) on
the Amphibious Staff, flew up to Ndeni Island and made a ground reconnais-
sance of nearby Trevanion Island, our proposed airfield site.
. . . What may not be so well known is the fact that the project was opposed
with equal violence by COMAIRSOPAC (Rear Admiral McCain ). He ob-
jected to the diversion of aircraft and construction forces. . . . I reported
that the maximum runway which could be built was about 4000 feet. Also
that because of irregular terrain and heavy woods, the project was impossible
u COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOP.4CFOR, 151951 Aug. 1942.
n COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, 170230 Aug. 1942.
‘S CTF 62 Op Plan A9–42, 20 Aug. 1942.
“ RKT to Vandegrift, letter, 23 Aug. 1942.