US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

394 Amphibians Came To Conquer
the Expeditionary Force Commander’s Staff in Sa~utoga got the word and
Admiral Fletcher insists it was between 0500 and 0600 when he was
awakened and given the word. He was awakened shortly after os 30 on the
9th and told that COMSOPAC had approved the withdrawal of the Air
Support Force. He then approved the change to the previously decided upon
withdrawal course which was to be made at 0400. It was quite obvious that
had the word on Savo been available to the TF 61 Duty Officer in the
Saratoga at that time, it would have been given at that time to the Admiral.
He later said:
Had I known of the attack then, since we were on a northerly course, I
might well have continued on it. But it wasn’t until much later that I was
awakened and given the first indication of Savo.gg
Admiral Kinkaid when asked about the decision of CTF 61 to withdraw
the carriers on 8 August said that it was “a valid decision at the time, but
wouldn’t have been valid later in the war.’””
Scanning the figures in the fuel table given in detail before, from the
safe distance of 25 years, might lead one to observe that on the 8th of
August 1942 when Rear Admiral Kinkaid was making the entry in his
War Diary, only the Gray~on (DD-435 ) (Lieutenant Commander Frederick
J. Bell) justified the critical stage of worry about fuel which undoubtedly
existed in TG 61.1.
Even though not critical, the fuel situation in the Expeditionary Force
was a problem as indicated in the report of the transport P~esident ]uchon
which was landing troops at Tulagi the morning of 7 August.
At oi’>9 rigged ship for fueling destroyers of TRANSDIV 12 (APDs).
At this time fire support groups and planes were shelling and bombing
Tulagi, and
between 1004 and 1239, APDs McKe~n and Little were fueled. At 1304
APD Cohnm prepared to fuel alongside but numerous enemy plane radar
contacts received during the afternoon prevented, so that it was not until the
third attempt that fueling was completed at 175o.1o1
In 1963, Admiral Kinkaid could not remember whether he was asked for
a recommendation by CTF 61, before that officer (Fletcher) went to COM-
SOPAC with his recommendation to withdraw the carriers from the support
area, but he did not believe that he was consulted. He knows that he raised no
m (a) Fletcher; (b) Rear Admiral Harry Smith, a lieutenant commander in 1942 and the Flag
Lieutenant to Vice Admiral Fletcher, related the same story in an interview on 17 May 1963.
‘mKinkaid.
‘“ President Jackson Action Report, 19 Aug. 1942.