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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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Logistics: August 1942-Febvaary 1943 425<br />

support your plans. Just as soon as possible, I will fly in to see you in order to<br />

be able better to help you out. Up to the present I have not been able to come,<br />

since we have all been working night and day to get things moving toward<br />

you and I have thought it better for me to stay here in charge.”<br />

However, Commander Compton’s written orders from CINCPAC centered<br />

around an air base, and Compton had landed during a period when<br />

the airfield had no steel matting and hence was vulnerable to rain, as well<br />

as to bombing and shelling. Keeping the airstrip in shape and building up<br />

communications took Compton’s time. Although requested by despatch on<br />

a number of occasions and by letter on 15 September, his first plan for<br />

development of an Advanced Naval Base in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area<br />

went forward about 28 September 1942.4’ In a subsequent letter Com-<br />

mander Compton stated:<br />

My main difficulty has been the lack of qualified officers to whom I could turn<br />

over details so that I would be free to proceed with more general plans. so<br />

Captain Compton’s present remembrance is supported by the few official<br />

documents located. On 27 September 1942, as Commanding Officer of CUB<br />

One, he wrote to $$)MAIRSOPAC:<br />

I have, in the employment of CUB One, endeavored to carry out the spirit<br />

of CINJCPAC serial 09$)10 [supporting plan] for which CUB One and Thir-<br />

teen were sent out. This involved the construction, operation, administration<br />

and maintenance of a land plane base at CACT<strong>US</strong>, seaplane base at RING-<br />

BOLT; radio, harbor defense, hospital and other facilities. I consider that still<br />

my mission.51<br />

His remembrance of his aspects of the logistic support problem on<br />

Guadalcanal was:<br />

<strong>The</strong> basic difference between Kelly Turner and me was: Why were the CUBS<br />

in SOPAC—to build bases or to support troops? 52<br />

Rear Admiral Turner, upset by the supply support difficulties of the first<br />

month of improvised logistic support of the <strong>Marine</strong>s and the lack of any<br />

real start toward the development of bases in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area,<br />

became convinced in early September 1942, that there had to be a Flag officer<br />

whose primary duty was the planning, the development, and the perform-<br />

48RKT to AAV, letter, 23 Aug. 1942,<br />

40(a) C/S COMPHIBFORSOPAC to RKT, rnemorandurn of 26 Aug. 1942; (b) COMSOPAC,<br />

dispatches 072206, 231326 Sep. 1943; (c) COMPHIBFORSOPAC to COMADVBASE CACT<strong>US</strong>-<br />

RINGBOLT, letter, 15 Sep. 1942.<br />

wJPC to RKT, letter, 8 Oct. 1942.<br />

“ COMCUBO to COMAIRSOPAC, letter, 27 Sep. 1942.<br />

‘2Compton.

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