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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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Planning jor Paring the Japanese Toenaiis 527<br />

OPERATIONAL FIRSTS<br />

<strong>The</strong> TOENAILS Operation was the first major Pacific amphibious landing<br />

wherein ( 1) “transport planes were used to drop supplies and needed mate-<br />

rial, including shells and water to our combat troops” and (2) large tugs<br />

were available to salvage landing craft and landing boats.45<br />

It also was the first amphibious operation where a Flag or General officer<br />

with a small staff was set up to control all aircraft in the objective area. In<br />

TOENAILS, Brigadier General Francis R. Mulcahy, <strong>US</strong>MC, Commander,<br />

Headquarters and Forward Echelon, 2nd <strong>Marine</strong> Aircraft Wing, was desig-<br />

nated Commander Air New Georgia. He was positioned in the McCawIey<br />

together with CTF 31 until the prospective Commander Occupation Force<br />

moved his command post ashore to Rendova Island. When that event<br />

occurred on D-Day, Mulcahy was to shift ashore to work under the command<br />

of that of-liter. Direction of fighters over Task Force 31 on D-Day initially<br />

was in the destroyer }enkitzs, which had a fighter director group aboard.<br />

Close air support direction initially was in the McCawley which had a close<br />

air support group aboard. Both of these latter groups were under orders to<br />

shift ashore as soon as practical.4c<br />

INTELLIGENCE<br />

<strong>The</strong> Intelligence Annexes of CTF 3 1’s two Operation Plans (A8–43 and<br />

A9–43 ) for TOENAILS contained over 60 maps and drawings. Otherwise<br />

they were sketchy to an extreme. But even this was better intelligence than<br />

SOPAC’S Operation Plan 14–43 for TOENAILS which had no Intelligence<br />

Annex at all.<br />

Despite the sketchiness of the intelligence data supplied, the overall<br />

guesstimate of Japanese naval strength in the Solomons on 13 June 1943, by<br />

post-war Japanese account, was reasonably conservative: “6 destroyers and<br />

5 submarines versus actually 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers and 8 submarines in the<br />

8th Fleet with Headquarters in the Shortlands.”<br />

<strong>The</strong> 30 May 1943 estimate of Japanese air strength in the Solomons and<br />

at Kavieng and Rabaul—393 planes—also was low, on the date it was made,<br />

4’ (a) CTF 31 Op Plan A8-43, Annexes (E) and (F); (b) CINCPAC Operations in the Pacific<br />

Ocean Areas, July 1943. P. 13.<br />

‘0 (a) CTF 33 Op Plan 7-43, 18 Jun. 1943; (b) Commander New Georgia Air Force (Brigadier<br />

General Mulcahy, <strong>US</strong>MC), Special Action Report covering the 1st phase of the New Georgia<br />

Operations, 29Jun.–l3 Aug. 1943. No ser, undated,

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