US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

372 Amphibians Came To Conquer
of any ‘approaching’ Jap force, I would have done something—maybe the
wrong thing, but I would have done something. What they wrote is just a
g.d. distortion, and that sort of thing is why I want you to be g.d. certain
that you don’t distort in what you write.
What I failed to do was to assume that the g.d. pilots couldn’t count and
couldn’t identify and wouldn’t do their job and stick around and trail the
Japs and send through a later report. And I failed to assume that McCain
wouldn’t keep me informed of what his pilots were or weren’t doing. And I
failed to guess that despite the reported composition of the force, and the
reported course, and the reported speed, the Japs were headed for me via a
detour, just like we arrived at Guadalcanal via a detour.
I wouldn’t mind if they said I was too g.d. dumb to have crystal-balled
these things, but to write that I was told of an ‘approaching force’ and then
didn’t do anything, that’s an ~nprintable, unprintable, unprintable lie.
Nobody reported an ‘approaching force’ to me. They reported a force which
could and did approach, but they reported another kind of a force headed
another kind of way.
was a masterful failure of air reconnaissance and my fellow aviators.AS
$%
BRINGING REAR ADMIRAL CRUTCI-ILEY
TO THE FLAGSHIP
In regard to Morison’s labeling as a “mistake” the summoning of Rear
Admiral Crutchley in the Australia to the McCawIey, the fact is that Rear
Admiral Crutchley had sent the following despatch to his immediate senior
shortly after nine o’clock the morning of 8 August:
As Second-in-Command when you have time could I have rough outline of
present situation and future intentions.”
This was a request not lightly to be disregarded or denied. It was received
before the message reporting 40 heavy Japanese bombers heading toward the
Tulagi-Guadalcanal area, which required all the transports, including the
McCawley to get underway.
The COMPHIBFORSOPAC Staff members interviewed could not remem-
ber why their Admiral had put off Rear Admiral Crutchley until evening. In
1961–1962 they rationalized that it was probable that CTF 62 (Turner) felt,
at that mid-morning hour, and with no favorable reports in from Tulagi
where the Marines had been held up, that he did not know enough more
than CTF 62.6 (Crutchley) did about the “present situation and future in-
*Turner.
‘“CTF 62.6 to CTF 62,072211 Aug. 1942, Hepburn Report, Annex T.