US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

1941 Deveiop?nents for Amphibious war 207
tasks, but one for which up until the early years of the Twentieth Century,
they made minimal advance preparations until the event was upon them.
The thought that this problem of overwater movement of troops and
then assault on a foreign shore would be with our Navy in a large way in
any war with Japan started to percolate through the Navy in the immediate
post-Spanish American War era. Advance Base work was studied at Newport,
Rhode Island, in 1901 and a permanent Advanced Base School was estab-
lished at New London, Connecticut, in 1910-and moved to Philadelphia
in 1911.
Starting in 1902–1903, Marines became occasional to frequent participants
in the annual winter Fleet cruises as the backbone and sinew, first of an
Advanced Base Defense Force, then of an Expeditionary Force, and finally
of a Fleet Marine Force.
After the British-French unhappy experience at Gallipoli, Turkey, the
study of that World War I amphibious campaign became a regular part of
the Naval War College course at Newport.’3 In the early 1930s students
at the Naval War College were taught that the lessons of Gallipoli to
remember included:
1. Do not fail to provide for clear command channels to all forces of all
Servicesand arms involved, and for d single forceful overall commander.
2. Be sure, by detailed orders, properly distributed at all echelons, that
All Hands’ know what the objectives are, who does what when, and where
the coordinating levels of command are located.
3. Do not attack prematurely with insufficient forces.
4. Provide for supplies and equipment to be stowed aboard ship in reasonable
proximation to the order in which they will be used or needed ashore,
i.e., later called combat loading.
It can be presumed that Captain Turner learned these and other amphibi-
ous lessons during his three years at the Naval War College, and that their
possible violation in the Guadalcanal campaign bothered him. It may be
that Commander Nimitz and Captain King, who attended the Naval War
College in 1923 and 1932, respectively, paid particular attention to the above
first lesson of Gallipoli, for they implemented the principle of clear command
channels and forceful commanders during World War II.
It also can be presumed that in addition to these “do’s and don’ts,” Captain
‘a (a) Captain W. D. Puleston, USN, The Durdunelfef Cumpaign (Annapolis: U. S. Naval
Institute, 1926). (b) Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC “’The Development of
Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy,” Marine Corp Gazette (July 1946-February 1947).