US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

252 An.zphibiws Came To Conquer
It appeared also to the Navy Planners that if a Japanese Expeditionary
Force moved towards either of these areas, it would have to do so under the
close protection of the main Japanese Fleet. The defeat of the Japanese Fleet
and the turning back of the Japanese Expeditionary Force would depend, as
it did later at Coral Sea and Midway, primarily on the Navy, and therefore
these areas should be within naval command. On the other hand, the movement
of Japanese Expeditionary Forces over short distances of sea area, such
as from Amboy in the Netherlands East Indies to Darwin, Australia (6OO
miles ), might occur before the United States Navy could rise to its responsi-
bility and intervene, and the defeat of the Japanese Expeditionary Force
would be primarily a land-air task.”
The Army Planners and General Marshall eventually accepted this rea-
soning, and New Zealand, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and the
Fijis were placed in the Pacific Ocean Area of responsibility. This was not
a complete victory for the Naval Planning Staff, however. By agreeing to the
1650 East Meridian as the borderline between the Southwest Pacific Area
and the Pacific Ocean Area south of the equator to 100 South, the Navy
Planners let themselves in for a very diflicult negotiating period when a
couple of months later they started to get the Navy-Marine amphibious
team moving northward toward the Solomons in the South Pacific.
THE SCALES TIP AGAIN
Following General Marshall’s return from London, the scales tipped
markedly towards giving BOLERO priority over any further build-up of air
units or ground strong points on the line of communications from Hawaii
to Australia. BOLERO was the general operation of transferring American
Armed Forces to the United Kingdom for future use in the European
Theater.
However, the period was seized by Rear Admiral Turner to outline to
Admiral King his concept of the future war to be waged against Japan in
the 25 million square miles of the Western Pacific. This concept is well
worth summarizing:
a. The FIRST STAGE in which we are now engaged, envisages building
up forces and positions in the Pacific Theater and particularly in the South
Pacific and Southwest Pacific for the purpose of holding these areas, and in
* Admiral King, memorandum for the President, 5 Apr. 1942 (in CCS 57/2).