US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

414 Amphibians Canze To Conquer
It was their fight, the Navy’s fight; it was their war against the Japanese; and
they were going to clean it up if they could.’”
The Chief of the Army Air Corps carried news of the worried state of
the naval commanders in the South Pacific Force back to Washington, where
he arrived on 2 October 1942, having covered 21,000 miles in 12 days. While
his solution to the Admirals’ problems was far from being similar to theirs,
he served a most valuable purpose in alerting the home folks in Washington
that there were SOPAC and Pacific problems crying for early assistance.
Lieutenant General Arnold’s appraisal of the state of the logistic art
in the Navy was conveyed in a memorandum to General Marshall which
said:
Naval planning and operations to date have demonstrated a definite lack of
appreciation Of the logistic fa~or> and aS a consequence, operations to date
have lacked continuity by reason of the shortage of essential supplies and
installations to support military operations.z7
And to this statement many naval Iogisticians would say “amen.”
Lieutenant General Arnold’s round of briefings of important people in
Washington included the President, which probably played a real part in
the President’s memorandum to the “Eyes Only of the Joint Chiefs” on 24
October 1942, which in turn played such a vital part in the Guadalcanal
victory. The President wrote:
My anxiety about the Southwest Pacific is to make sure that every possible
weapon gets into the area to hold GuadaIcanal, and that having held in this
crisis, munitions, planes and crews are on the way to take advantage of our
success.
This memorandum came just 12-13 days after the Battle of Cape Espe-
rance during which the surface combatant forces of the Japanese Navy and
the United States Navy had traded punches and losses in the Iron Bottom
Sound area, and just nine days after Admiral Nimitz was recording in his
15 October Daily Command Summary:
It now appears that we are unable to control the sea area in the Guadalcanal
Area. Thus our supply of the positions will only be done at great expense to
US.The situation is not hopeless, but it is certainly critical.
* Ibid., p. 348. Time late September 1942.
m C/S AAF to C/S USA, memorandum, 6 Oct. 1942. OPD 38.5. Modern Military Records
Division, National Archives.