US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

CHAPTER VIII
CACTUS Bound
THE JAPANESE SUBDUE OUR SERVICES
DIFFERENCES
By early July it was obvious to all the planning staffs in Washington that
the time had arrived when something had to be dcme to really stop the
southward extension of island control and daily air reconnaissance by the
Japanese. Both the Army and the Navy, at long last, were agreed that
offensive air-sea-ground action was the answer. Cooperation by all hands, at
all levels, might lack from practice, but did not lack from willing effort.’
While Rear Admiral Turner was at Pearl Harbor ( 5–8 July 1942) radio
intelligence made it clear that Japanese forces would be found in some
strength on Guadalcanal. If the Japanese after local reconnaissance had
chosen Guadalcanal as the best place to build an airfield, and moved their
Pioneer Forces there to do this essential chore, and antiaircraft units to
protect the site, then Rear Admiral Turner knew the Navy and Marines’
first priority task must be Guadalcanal.
Since the available amphibious forces in the South Pacific were not ade-
quate to land at Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Islands and at the islands, Tulagi,
Gavutu, Florida, and Guadalcanal, in the Solomons all at the same time, the
decision was made at CINCPAC Headquarters to postpone the occupation of
Ndeni, where the enemy was not, until Tulagi and Guadalcanal, where the
enemy was, were in hand. This was considered to be within both the spirit
and letter of the Joint Chiefs of staff directives, which directed the seizure of
Tulagi and ‘