US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Savo—Tbe Galling Defeat 383
for we cannot prosecute the kind of offensive required, without welcoming a
night engagement .70
DEFENSIVE DECISIONS
At 1807 local time 8 August, 1942, Vice Admiral Fletcher (CTF 61) sent
this message to COMSOPAC (Ghormley).
Fighter plane strength reduced from 99 to 78. In view of large number of
enemy torpedo planes and bombers in this area, I recommend the immediate
withdrawal of my carriers. Request tankers be sent forward immediately as
fuel running low.
Vice Admiral Ghormley approved this request, thus setting the stage for
the withdrawal of the air support for the amphibians and for the Battle of
Savo Island. The background for this crucial withdrawal follows:
(A) The Prediction
In the despatch which Vice Admiral Ghormley and General MacArthur
sent on 8 July to their respective Chiefs of Staff opposing the launching of
WATCHTOWER in early August, they said:
The Carrier Task Groups will be themselves exposed to attack by land based
air while unprotected by our land based aviation and it is extremely doubtful
that they will be able to retain fighter escort to the transport area, especially
should hostile naval forces approach.?l
(B) The Basic Problem
Again on 11 July, Vice Admiral Ghormley had advised his seniors:
I wish to emphasize that the basic problem of this operation is the protection
of surface ships against land based aircraft attack during the approach, the
landing attacks, and the unloading.’2
mV. Crutchley to RKT, letter, 13 Aug. 1942.
n COMSOPAC to COMINCH, 081012 Jul. 1942.
w cOMSOpAC to COMINCH, 112000 Jul. 1942.