US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Planning for War, 1940-1941 185
Ambassador in Washington to present the message to the Department of
State exactly at 1 p.m. Sunday, 7 December, had not been circulated.
NEXT, THE DIRECTOR OF WAR PLANS
When the Director of War Plans saw the first 13 parts of the diplomatic
end of negotiations despatch, he
considered the despatch very important but as long as those officers
[Ingersoll and Wilkinson] had seen it, I did not believe it was my
function to take any action.e4
When Rear Admiral Turner was shown the one o’clock message in
Admiral Stark’s ofice about noon, he
recognized its very great importance and asked him [Stark] if anything
had been done about it. He told me General Marshall was sending a
dispatch, and I did nothing further about it because I considered that
would cover the situation.es
Even had he seen the 14th part at this time or prior thereto, the Director
of War Plans thought:
It was not my business to send that dispatch out. I consider that that
was entirely the province of the Ofice of Naval Intelligence. . . It was
no evaluation whatsoever. My office never sent out information.ee
In summary:
The first 13 parts of the Japanese despatch inspired neither the DNI nor
the DWP to believe it should go to the Fleet.
The 14th part inspired the DNI with a belief that it should go to the
Fleet. The CNO did not carry through on the recommendation. The DWP
did not receive the 14th part of the “end of negotiation” despatch in his
own office until after the attack.
The “one o’clock” despatch inspired both the DNI and the DWP to
make recommendations for the CNO to send an advisory to the Fleet. The
delay in sending this advisory, in part at least, was due to a reluctance of
Admiral Stark to accept and immediately act personally and dramatically on
the recommendation of these two of his subordinates, both united and voicing
the same opinions by calling Admiral Kimmel on the voice-scramble telephone
which was on his desk.
UIbid., p. 1924.
m Ibid., p. 1924.
- ibid., p. 2025.