US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Sauo—Tbe Galling Defeat 357
Commanding Officers still alive, as well as gathering a large amount of
documentary evidence.
A two-volume Strategical and Tactical Ana/ysis of the Battle of Savo Island
has been published by the U.S. Naval War College at Newport, Rhode
Island.’ Several full-length books on the battle, one labeling Admiral Turner
“a blacksmith’s son,” have been written for popular consumption.’ Morison
devotes a lengthy chapter to the subject in his 15-volume history of United
States Navai Ope~atiotis in World War 11 and much space in his other
writings about that war.4
It is not the intention to rehash in detail here this sad story of the U.S.
Navy in its first night heavy surface ship fight with the Japanese Navy. If
there are any readers who are not familiar with this night battle, such readers
should consult Morison before going further in this Chapter. Sut%ce it to
record here that it occurred at the Savo Island terminus of a skillfully con-
cealed Japanese dash south from Rabaul. It was carried through by a hastily
gathered eight ship cruiser-destroyer force, which in the early hours of 9
August effected complete surprise and one-sided damage in turn to two
different five-ship Allied cruiser-destroyer units patrolling to protect our
transports at Tulagi and Guadalcanal.
The Japanese Navy achieved a stunning victory. It was aggressive in the
planning concept of this operation and it was equally aggressive in carrying
it out. Their night-time operational. ability was far superior to that of the
U.S. Navy ships companies which they encountered. They cleared from
the roster three United States heavy cruisers and one Australian heavy
cruiser with minor damage to their own ships. They placed the waters lying
between the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the books as “Iron Bottom
Sound” and manned it with an initial complement of United States Navy
and Australian Navy ships.
Admiral Turner’s comment in 1960 on the 1942 battle was as follows:
Whatever responsibility for the defe~t is mine, I accept,
Admiral Hepburn, who, in 1942 investigated the defeat for Admiral King
did a first-rate job. The Naval War College in 1950, did the most thorough
analysis possible. 1 had my chance to comment on the Hepburn report to
9 Naval War College, Savo Island, Vols. I and II.
“ (a) Richard F. Newcomb, Savo The Incredible Nava! Debacie off Guadalcanal (New York:
HoIt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961); (b) Stan Smith, The Butde of Suvo (New York: McFadden-
Bartell Corp., 1962).
‘ (a) Morison, S~.uggIe for Grdulcumzl (Vol V), ch. 2; (b) Samuel E. Morison “Guadalcanal-
1942” S~zrduy Everzing PoJ/, vol. 235 (July 28-August 4, 1962), pp. 22-23, 63–65; (c) Samuel
E. Morison, Two Ocean Wur (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1963), pp. 167–77.