US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Logistics: Angust 1942–February 1943 405
in the utilization of all available cargo space as “commercial loading” but
was essential. And the transport Captains learned a second phase of the
complex problem at Guadalcanal and Tulagi. For no matter how hard the
planners had planned and how skillfully the Transport Quartermaster had
loaded, it was almost inevitable that actual operations would turn out to
be different than planned operations, and real and pressing needs would
arise for changes in the Marines’ priorities for unloading the logistical
support.
LOGISTIC>THE BUGBEAR
Admiral Kinkaid, when asked if he had talked with Rear Admiral Turner
during the August to November 1942 period during which Kinkaid was
CTF 16, replied:
Only once. That was after the Battle of Santa Cruz. (26-27 October 1942]
He was mainly concerned with logistical matters at Guadalcanal then.’
Logistics got off to a bad start in the South Pacific and in WATCH-
TOWER, the area’s first operational venture. This occurred because of
several questionable logistical decisions made outside the South Pacific Area,
relating to time and distance, as well as because of an inadequate apprecia-
tion of logistical problems by those within the SOPAC Area. A particular
problem was the need to move logistical support bases forward as opera-
tions were undertaken to halt the enemy and, if possible, move him backward
toward Japan,
During the early months of 1942, the naval activities of South Pacific
island bases, even though they fell within the CINCPAC command area,
generally made direct application to the logistic agencies in the United
States for their support. They did this rather than apply to Pearl Harbor
since Pearl Harbor did not have material resources to spare or even personnel
to handle the heavy logistical communication load.
In April 1942, the Army directed that its forces in the South Pacific Area
should be supplied directly by the Port of Embarkation, San Francisco. At
the same time the Commander Service Force Pacific Fleet indicated a
willingness to handle logistic requests from all bases—Army or Navy-in
the South Pacific Area. Since both Army and Navy bases and their com-
4Kinkaid.