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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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Savo—Tbe Galling Defeat 371<br />

subordinates did or did not do certain things, filed with Admiral Hepburn’s<br />

investigation of this 7–lo August 1942 period. CTF 63’s story just is not<br />

currently available. <strong>The</strong> War Diaries of COMAIRSOPAC and the <strong>US</strong>S<br />

McFarland, seaplane tender at Maramsike Estuary, Malaita, record only the<br />

incomplete nature of the planned searches.<br />

Admiral Turner desired that the air reconnaissance matter be thoroughly<br />

researched in available records and then presented to him again. He died<br />

before this was done,<br />

In 1960, he believed that CTF 63’s air search despatch report for the eighth<br />

of August was unjustifiably tardy, and that it was inexcusable not to have<br />

told him earlier in the day of the TF 63 failure to search because of weather,<br />

or the extent and results of the special search he had requested. Because of<br />

the tardiness or omission of the air search reports, he did not know that TF<br />

63 planes had not searched the Slot areas to the north of New Georgia. Since<br />

no positive sighting reports by the TF 63 planes in this area were made during<br />

the day, and no report of inability to search was made by Rear Admiral<br />

McCain, Rear Admiral Turner watched the clock on the Flag Bridge move<br />

from 8 to 9 August believing that it was a reasonable deduction that no<br />

enemy surface forces were in the area.t3<br />

CTF 63’s (McCain’s) failure to tell CTF 61 (Fletcher) and CTF 62<br />

(Turner) that his planes were carrying through their assigned searches in a<br />

very limited way because of weather problems or other reasons vitiated the<br />

agreement made by CTF 63 on the Saratoga on 26 July 1942. As related in<br />

the Hepburn Inquiry:<br />

It was specifically arranged by the Commanders Task Force Sixty-One, Sixty-<br />

Two, and Sixty-Three, that if the air scouting could not be made in any<br />

sector, Task Force Sixty-One would fill in for short range scouting, both<br />

morning and late afternoon, to protect against the approach of surface<br />

forces.”<br />

TURNER VERS<strong>US</strong> THE FIELD OF HISTORIANS<br />

Admiral Turner’s reaction in 1960 to the official histories or monographs<br />

stating that he was advised of an “Approaching Force” is informative:<br />

I have been accused of being and doing many things but nobody before<br />

ever accused me of sitting on my awrse and doing nothing. If I had known<br />

“ Turner.<br />

4’CINCPAC, letter, PAC–I I–SN–A17, Ser. 0088s of 28 Jun. 1943, subj: Comments on<br />

Hepburn Report, Annex F to encl. (A), p. 2.

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