US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

Planning for lVar, 1940-1941 167
Washington through the breaking of Japanese coded messages were reading
the Japanese Ambassador’s report of his conversation with Turner and others
in the Ambassador’s dispatches to the Japanese Foreign Office. Unfortunately,
diplomatic Japanese dispatches prior to I July 1941 are not printed
in the Pearl Harbor Report, so it is not possible to compare the two partici-
pants’ reports on the 12 March conversation to their seniors.
The 12 March 1941 Turner conversation with Admiral Nomura was
followed by another on 20 July 1941 which Turner duly reported.z’ Admiral
Nomura, late on this particular afternoon, and with what to him was a hot
piece of Japanese Army news had tried to visit Admiral Stark, but had not
found him at home, so he called at Rear Admiral Turner’s residence. The
main purpose of his visit was to watch the Navy ripples on the Potomac,
when a Japanese land mine went off in the Far East, for the news was that
“within the next few days Japan expected to occupy French Indo China. ”
From the strength of its ripples, Admiral Nomura could hope to obtain a
naval estimate whether the United States would go to war with Japan as
a result.
Actually the Indo China occupation took place the following day, 21 July
1941. The Japanese Army just had not let their Foreign Office in on the
exact date. Yet, the top echelon in Naval Operations already had been
alerted on 19 July 1941 by decoding a Japanese diplomatic message of 14
July that the Japanese Army soon would move into Indo China.” So Rear
Admiral Turner was not surprised by Admiral Nomura’s news.
Turner’s report said Nomura made these points:
a. He had accepted the duty as Ambassador only after great insistence by
his friends, particularly high ranking n~val officers and the more conservative
group of Army officers,
b. It is essential th~t Japan have uninterrupted access to necessary raw
materials.
c. Japan’s economic position is bad and steadily getting worse.
d. Japan must make some arrangement through which support of the
Chungking regime will be reduced.
e. Essential for Japan’s security is the more or less permanent stationing
of Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia in order to break the connection between
Russia and China.
f. Within the next few days Japan expects to occupy French Indo China.
. This occupation has become essential.
g. Japan contemplates no further move to the South for the time being.
JSDWp to CNO, Op_Iz–CTB, letter. %r 083 il? of 21 Jul. 19 Il.
X Peavl Harbm Heavin.z r, part 12. pp. 2–3.