29.01.2013 Views

US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

Planning for Paring the ~apanese Toenails 485<br />

Just a few days before Rear Admiral Wilkinson flew off to Australia,<br />

Admiral King on 8 February 1943 sent another memorandum to General<br />

Marshall, commenting on General MacArthur’s reply to the Joint Chiefs of<br />

Staff despatch of 8 January 1943 and indirectly commenting on the command<br />

problem in his area.’<br />

On the day before Lincoln’s Birthday 1943, Vice Admiral Halsey informed<br />

COMINCH that the rapid consolidation of Japanese positions in the New<br />

Georgia Group emphasized the need for early United States seizure of these<br />

islands, He recommended that pressure on the Japanese be continued in the<br />

Southern Solomons, and that the occupation of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands<br />

(specifically Makin and Tarawa) in the Central Pacific, suggested by<br />

COMINCH as the next appropriate task after CLEANSLATE, be deferred<br />

until later.’<br />

CINCPAC went along with this COMSOPAC recommendation.<br />

On 14 February 1943, when there were many who believed the Japanese,<br />

now ousted from the Southern Solomons, would strike at some other island<br />

group in the South Pacific, Admiral Nimitz made the very shrewd estimate<br />

that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Guadalcanal probably indicated<br />

that the Japanese would shift to the strategical defensive in the South Pacific.<br />

Post-war Japanese records indicate that this is what happened.s<br />

On 17 February 1943, the CINCPAC Staff Planners “assumed” that COM-<br />

SOPAC “will attack Munda next and will employ one <strong>Marine</strong> Division.”<br />

This represented some beefing up from the earlier concept of one Regimental<br />

Combat Team and two Raider Battalions, but still was a fair step away from<br />

the realities of the operation insofar as the landing forces are concerned.<br />

<strong>The</strong> planners reported to CINCPAC:<br />

It seems entirely feasible to make a simultaneous thrust up the Solomons, and<br />

in the Gilberts. Capture of objectives seems probable. Holding in Gilberts<br />

seems doubtful. . . . Because of preparation time required, May 15, 1943,<br />

is selected as the target date.g<br />

<strong>The</strong> guesstimate of a Dog Day of 15th of May by the CINCPAC Staff was<br />

missed by more than a long month, for it was the 21st of June before two<br />

companies of <strong>Marine</strong>s were landed ahead of schedule at Segi Point, New<br />

‘ (a) COMINCH to C/S <strong>US</strong>A, memoranda, Ser 0040 of 6 Jan. 1943; Ser 00195 of 8 Feb. 1943<br />

and replies thereto; (b) JCS despatch 192 of 8 Jan.1943.<br />

7 (a) COMINCH to CINCPAC, 092200 Feb. 1943; (b) COMSOPAC to COMINCH, 110421<br />

Feb. 1943; (c) CINCPAC to COMINCH, 112237 Feb. 1943.<br />

8 (a) CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, 142357 Feb. 1943; (b) Japanme Imperial General Headquarters<br />

(IGHQ), Army Directives, Vol. II, Agreement of 22 March 1943, p. 43.<br />

‘ CINCPAC CornmrandS~mmcvy, Book Three, 17 Feb. 1943, p. 1398.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!