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US Marine Corps - The Black Vault

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258 Amphibians Canze To Conquer<br />

Minister, on 28 May 1942, in a despatch to the President stated that “certain<br />

difficulties had arisen in the planning,” put in a plug for the occupation of<br />

North Africa and stated that Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was being<br />

sent to Washington to discuss “a landing in the North of Norway.” 84<br />

Lord Louis arrived on 3 June 1942, by which time the Army Air Force B-175<br />

had already started making near-misses on Admiral Tanaka’s Transport<br />

Group of the Japanese Midway Occupation Force,<br />

However, on 1 June 1942, the President was telling Mr. Molotov, the<br />

Soviet Union’s People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, in Washington as a<br />

special representative of Commissar Stalin, that he expected to establish a<br />

Second Front in 1942, and giving him a strong commitment to do so.” If<br />

the President’s word was to be his bond, it was apparent to the military<br />

planning stafls that the priority build-up in England of United States troops<br />

and landing craft must continue at maximum rate.<br />

Elated by the Navy’s victory at Midway, on 4 June 1942, the whole<br />

COMINCH Planning Staff was anxious that the United States seize the<br />

Pacific Ocean initiative from the Japanese. This could not be done by sitting<br />

back and congratulating each other on the first real major victory of the<br />

Pacific War. Midway had to be promptly followed by new initiatives in the<br />

Pacific Ocean, and this was the point Rear Admiral Turner stressed as in late<br />

May and early June he progressively handed over his Chief Planner’s billet on<br />

Admiral King’s staff to his relief, Rear Admiral Charles M. Cooke. <strong>The</strong> very<br />

minimum effort necessary to retain the intiative, he believed, would be to<br />

seize island positions essential for disrupting the flow of strategic materials<br />

within the Japanese Co-prosperity Sphere.fifi<br />

By late June 1942, the British Prime Minister was in Washington again,<br />

depressed over the surrender of his 33,000-man garrison at Tobruk. He was<br />

anxious for American help nearly everywhere except on the continent of<br />

Europe. He was ready “to bury ‘SLEDGEHAMMER,’ which had been dead<br />

for some time.” “<br />

ADMIRAL KING STIRS UP A PESTILENCE—<br />

LIGHTS UP A WATCHTOWER<br />

Admiral King seized this moment, when it appeared that United States<br />

U Churchill to Roosevelt, 28 May 1942, in Sherwood, Roosevelt ~nd Hopkins, p. 556.<br />

= Matloff and SnelI, Strategic Planning, pp. 231–32.<br />

mTurner.<br />

mChurchill, Tbe Hinge of Pate, pp. 382, 433.

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