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Aircraft Operations. Volume II - Construction of Visual and Instrument ...

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Appendix D to Chapter 1<br />

INDEPENDENT PARALLEL APPROACHES TO<br />

CLOSELY SPACED PARALLEL RUNWAYS<br />

1. INTRODUCTION<br />

1.1 Independent parallel approaches to closely spaced parallel runways are allowed when the distance between<br />

runways is not less than 1 035 m. To guarantee the safety <strong>of</strong> such operations, an obstacle assessment has to be carried<br />

out to protect a lateral break-out manoeuvre, which may need to be executed to avoid collision with a potential<br />

blundering aircraft. This will provide obstacle clearance from obstacles in the areas adjacent to the final approach<br />

segments.<br />

1.2 The following method provides an example for the assessment <strong>of</strong> these obstacles <strong>and</strong> was derived from an<br />

existing procedure used by one State. This section includes the considerations made in developing the basis for the<br />

assessment.<br />

1.3 It was considered that a difference exists between the current precision approach procedures described in<br />

Chapter 1, “<strong>Instrument</strong> l<strong>and</strong>ing system (ILS)” <strong>and</strong> Chapter 3, “MLS”, <strong>and</strong> the break-out procedures. For the approach<br />

procedures, an extensive data collection could be performed from which statistical probabilities <strong>of</strong> aircraft distributions<br />

could be obtained. In establishing a target level <strong>of</strong> safety (TLS) <strong>of</strong> 10 -7 , obstacle assessment surfaces (OAS) <strong>and</strong> the<br />

collision risk model (CRM) are derived. For the assessment surfaces <strong>of</strong> the break-out manoeuvre, this type <strong>of</strong> method<br />

was not considered feasible due to the low probability <strong>of</strong> occurrence <strong>of</strong> a break-out manoeuvre. From one State’s<br />

report, it was learned that the occurrence <strong>of</strong> a break-out during simultaneous approaches was initially assumed to be in<br />

the order <strong>of</strong> 10 -4 <strong>and</strong> 10 -5 per approach <strong>and</strong> may even be lower.<br />

1.4 In order to find obstacle clearance criteria for break-out manoeuvres, other methods were considered. One<br />

way was to use the existing missed approach criteria. However, these criteria are based on an occurrence <strong>of</strong> 10 -2 which<br />

may be unduly restrictive at some aerodromes, <strong>and</strong> missed approaches are not primarily designed for break-out<br />

manoeuvres.<br />

2. PARALLEL APPROACH OBSTACLE ASSESSMENT SURFACES (PAOAS)<br />

2.1 The proposed method for the obstacle assessment for simultaneous parallel approaches was based on existing<br />

criteria provided by one State (FAA Order 8260.41). An evaluation was carried out by the Obstacle Clearance Panel<br />

(OCP). This evaluation was made by means <strong>of</strong> certification <strong>and</strong> operational criteria contained in the FAR/JAR 23/25<br />

minimum climb requirements with all engines operating, together with the operational assumptions made by the ICAO<br />

Study Group on Simultaneous <strong>Operations</strong> on Parallel or Near-parallel <strong>Instrument</strong> Runways (SOIR), which established<br />

the minimum runway separation for use with simultaneous independent precision approaches (Cir 207). The evaluation<br />

considered that the initial part <strong>of</strong> the break-out manoeuvre would be executed in the l<strong>and</strong>ing configuration, followed by<br />

a climb gradient <strong>of</strong> 8.3 per cent within a height <strong>of</strong> 120 m (400 ft) above the break-out altitude/height. This evaluation<br />

indicated, in general, that the following restrictions to the break-out manoeuvres were necessary:<br />

a) no break-out manoeuvres below 120 m (400 ft); <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>II</strong>-1-1-App D-1 23/11/06

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