Phi-features and the Modular Architecture of - UMR 7023 - CNRS

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1.2 Modular architectures
In syntax and its adjacent modules of realization and interpretation, different
mechanisms see and operate on phi-features. Phi-features stand out an alphabet
shared across the modules. Through them, the distinctive character of each module
may be discerned in the character of its phi-feature phenomena, and the interpretability
of the output of one module to another investigated.
The modularity hypothesis in (5) is a proposal about the architecture of human
cognition:
(5) Modularity hypothesis: cognition is organized into modules that are characterized
by the following properties, their modular signature:
a. partly different information types (domain specificity)
(e.g. syntactic vs. phonological features)
b. partly different mechanisms/principles
(e.g. unbounded hierarchical vs. linearly adjacent dependencies)
c. partial encapsulation from (inaccessibility to) other modules
(e.g. phonology does not look into syntax and change an intermediate
computation or an intermediate representation)
The hypothesis admits a range of executions that differ in the type and degree
of uniqueness and autonomy of the modules. It characterizes the way cognition
functions, without commitments to the neurological localisability or innate character
of modules. It is applicable to a variety of cognitive domains, without asserting
the nonexistence of nonmodular systems. The formulation in (5) is suggested by
much recent inquiry, notably Chomsky (1980), Marr (1983), Pinker (1994),
Jackendoff (2002), Coltheart (1999), Sperber (2002), Barrett (2005), Barrett and
Kurzban (2006), and the articles in Carruthers, Laurence and Stitch (2005, 2007).
These build on but also differentiate themselves from Fodor's (1983) pioneering
proposal where modules are furthermore innately specified, fast-and-automatic,
neurologically localisable input transducers. A brief look at modularity in another
cognitive domain provides a perspective for its manifestations in language.
Low-level vision has been a paradigm case of modularity. Pylyshyn (1999)
presents an overview highlighting its high degree of uniqueness and autonomy
from the "central" cognitive system of goals, beliefs, and utilities (cf. also
Raftopoulos 2001). These characteristics of vision may be illustrated through visual
illusions such as those in Figure 1.1. In the Kanisza rectangle, interrupted contours
are automatically completed to build the percepts of a foregrounded rectangle
and four occluded circles, although the image can reflect a scene without
corresponding objects. In the Penrose triangle, the spatial relationships between
any two bars are locally computed from their joints, and then maintained when
they are all assembled into a single physically impossible object. In the Müller-