German (PDF) - Center for Security Studies (CSS) - ETH Zürich

154 Bulletin 1995 zur schweizerischen SicherheitspolitikArt des Projekts: Austria LaxenburgPartly funded by the International Institute ofApplied Systems Analysis (IIASA)Stand:LaufendAbschlusstermin: 1996/12Kontaktadresse:ETH ZürichForschungsstelle für internationale BeziehungenWiesenstrasse 98008 ZürichAutoren: Thomas Bernauer, Dieter Ruloff, Jozef Goldblat, OlegStrekal, Amy SmithsonTitel:Positive Incentives in Arms ControlKurzbeschrieb: The project examines ways and means of coping withnuclear proliferation problems in the years to come.In particular, it focuses on the role of positive incentivesin reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing thefurther spread of nuclear weapons. For analyticalpurposes, positive incentives are conceptualized astransfers of money, technology or other resources.Other, arguably more vague types of positive incentivesin arms control, such as for example confidencebuilding measures, diplomatic recognition, or involvementin economic integration efforts, are consideredonly in passing because much has been written onthem already. The study explains when and how differenttypes of positive incentives are or might beemployed, and evaluates the effectiveness of thesemeasures. The analytical framework developed inthis chapter (Chapter One) serves as the basis for areview of positive incentives in a broader range armscontrol regimes (Chapter Two) and two in-depth casestudies of nuclear arms control in Ukraine andNorth-Korea (Chapters Three and Four).Art des Projekts: Eigenprojekt der genannten Institution(en)Partly funded by the Swiss GovernmentStand:LaufendAbschlusstermin: 1996/12Kontaktadressen: ETH ZürichForschungsstelle für internationale BeziehungenWiesenstrasse 98008 Zürich