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An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

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IMMEDIATE INFERENCE. 8 I<br />

the <strong>at</strong>tempted converse is not even true as a m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong><br />

fact. Similarly, from<br />

&quot;<br />

some candid<strong>at</strong>es who sit for an<br />

&quot;<br />

we cannot infer th<strong>at</strong><br />

examin<strong>at</strong>ion do not pass it,&quot;<br />

some<br />

candid<strong>at</strong>es who pass an examin<strong>at</strong>ion do not sit for it.&quot;<br />

From the four examples just given, we derive the<br />

second rule <strong>of</strong> conversion, no term must be distributed<br />

in the converse which was not known to be distrib<br />

uted in the convertend.<br />

There are some further aspects <strong>of</strong> the process <strong>of</strong><br />

conversion which must not escape the student s <strong>at</strong>ten<br />

tion. In converting I and E we change neither quan<br />

tity nor quality ; the converse <strong>of</strong> SiP is PiS, and <strong>of</strong> SeP<br />

is PeS. This is called simple conversion, to distinguish<br />

it from the process which is necessary in converting A.<br />

Here, though we do not change the quality, we change<br />

the quantity ; the converse <strong>of</strong> SaP is PiS. This is called<br />

conversion by limit<strong>at</strong>ion, the equivalent <strong>of</strong> the Aristo<br />

telian phrase avrio-rpocf)}] Kara /Jbepo^ (<strong>An</strong>. Prior., i. 2).<br />

The mediaeval <strong>logic</strong>ians called it conversio per acridens.<br />

The conversion <strong>of</strong> an A proposition without limit<br />

<strong>at</strong>ion is a frequent source <strong>of</strong> fallacy. From<br />

&quot;<br />

ill-doers<br />

are ill-dreaders<br />

&quot;<br />

slip into the unlimited converse,<br />

(understood as universal) it is easy to<br />

&quot;<br />

ill-dreaders arc ill-<br />

doers,&quot; also understood universally. Similarly, &quot;all<br />

beautiful things are agreeable<br />

not follow th<strong>at</strong><br />

&quot;<br />

may be true, but it does<br />

&quot;<br />

all agreeable things are beautiful. We<br />

may know from the m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> the proposition th<strong>at</strong> S and<br />

P are coextensive. But the single proposition<br />

&quot;<br />

all S is<br />

&quot; P does not <strong>logic</strong>ally express the rel<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> coincidence<br />

or coextension between S and P ; to do this, we require<br />

the two propositions together,<br />

( (a) All S is P.<br />

\ (b)<br />

All P is S.<br />

The <strong>logic</strong>al converse is thus to be distinguished from<br />

F

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