An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

FALLACIES. 325
that A is south of B in order to prove that B is north
of A.
(6) In his list of fallacies, Aristotle next enumerates
TO n/Y] alriov 0)9 alrioV) afterwards rendered non causa
pro causa. This is not an inductive fallacy, for Aristotle s
airiov, causa, here signifies reason. It is to give as a
reason that which is no reason. The case on which
Aristotle dwells is that of introducing into an argument
irrelevant premises which lead to a contradiction, and
then "fathering the contradiction on the position con
troverted." But the name may be applied to any argu
ment containing steps without logical connection (with
out middle terms).
(7) Last on Aristotle s list stands the trivial fallacy of
"
"
Many Questions (TO TO- Svo epcorrjfjLara ev iroielv}.
It consists in demanding
"
a plain answer yes or
"
no
" Have
to a question which really implies an assumption e.g.,
"
you abandoned your intemperate habits yet ?
2. The Aristotelian classification lays perhaps too
much stress on language, the verbal expression of judg
ments, in making this the principle of division. But as
long as we retain his Terminology as all modern text
books retain it, it is well to retain his meaning also.
Confusion has been created by keeping the one without
the other. Thus, the division of fallacies into logical
and material, current since Whateley s time, is, by
Jevons and others, identified with Aristotle s division
into fallacies in dictione and extra dictionem. The Aris
totelian division rests on an entirely different basis.
The modern division has been clearly explained by Mr
Stock :
"
Whenever in the course of our reasoning we
are involved in error, either the conclusion follows from
the premises or it does not. If it does not, the fault
must lie in the process of reasoning, and we have then