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An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

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IQO<br />

THE CATEGORIES OR PREDICAMENTS.<br />

more positive terms do not come under the head <strong>of</strong><br />

strict dichotomy, for the contrasted terms in each act<br />

<strong>of</strong> division are contraries and not contradictories (ch. ii.<br />

4). Examples<br />

<strong>of</strong> this are : the division <strong>of</strong> lines into<br />

curved and not-curved (i.e., straight) ; or the division <strong>of</strong><br />

men into white and not white (i.e., yellow, red, brown,<br />

black). Sometimes, again, when we are arranging<br />

objects, as <strong>book</strong>s in a subject-c<strong>at</strong>alogue, and further<br />

arrangement becomes impossible, we add a class,<br />

&quot;<br />

Mis<br />

cellaneous,&quot; which really means<br />

&quot;<br />

All those not in any<br />

named class.&quot; But we never form a class th<strong>at</strong> can be<br />

indic<strong>at</strong>ed by a pure contradictory term.<br />

Part IV. The C<strong>at</strong>egories or Predicaments.<br />

ii. We have seen in i th<strong>at</strong> Aristotle makes a<br />

fundamental distinction between two kinds <strong>of</strong> predica<br />

tion : one which tells us wh<strong>at</strong> the thing really is, another<br />

which does not. The former expresses<br />

(a) The definition ;<br />

(It) Part <strong>of</strong> the definition, the genus or differentia.<br />

The other kind <strong>of</strong> predic<strong>at</strong>ion expresses properties th<strong>at</strong><br />

are &quot;accidental.&quot; We may distinguish<br />

the two kinds<br />

as essential and accidental predic<strong>at</strong>ion respectively.<br />

Aristotle considers th<strong>at</strong> the l<strong>at</strong>ter is improperly called<br />

&quot;<br />

predic<strong>at</strong>ion.&quot;<br />

In the case <strong>of</strong> essential predic<strong>at</strong>ion, the<br />

predic<strong>at</strong>e necessarily belongs to the subject, it is <strong>of</strong><br />

the subject ; in the case <strong>of</strong> accidental<br />

&quot;<br />

predic<strong>at</strong>ion,&quot; the<br />

predic<strong>at</strong>e is merely /;/ the subject (C<strong>at</strong>egories, ch. ii.)<br />

Bearing in mind these distinctions, we proceed to<br />

deal with an important question. We know th<strong>at</strong> every<br />

judgment is a st<strong>at</strong>ement about facts, it affirms (or<br />

denies) th<strong>at</strong> something exists in a certain &quot;<br />

P affirms th<strong>at</strong> S exists with<br />

&quot;<br />

: way S is<br />

the qualific<strong>at</strong>ion P. We

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