An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

FALLACIES. 323
duction," and yet is itself founded on Induction of the
weakest kind, per enumerationem siuiplicem ; it is there
fore only an "empirical law," true within the limits of
time, place, and circumstance which have come under
our actual observation. If it is the ultimate major
premise of all Induction, it must be a law of the nature
of things, true without exception of past, present, and
future. On this difficulty Mill says: "The precarious-
ness of the Method of Simple Enumeration is in an in
verse ratio to the largeness of the generalisation. The
process is delusive and insufficient, exactly in proportion
as the subject-matter of the proposition is special and
limited in extent. ... If we suppose, then, the subject-
matter of any generalisation to be so widely diffused
that there is no time, no place, and no combination of
circumstances, but must afford an example either of its
truth or of its falsity, and if it be never found otherwise
than true, its truth cannot be contingent upon any
collocations, unless such as exist at all times and
places. ... It is therefore an empirical law co-extensive
with all human experience, at which point the dis
tinction between empirical laws and laws of Nature
vanishes. 1
Stated briefly, Mill s argument is this. The
Law of Uniform Causation is of so universal a character
that every time and place must afford an instance either
of its truth or of \\sfalsity. It is observed to be true at
those times and places which have come within our
actual experience; therefore it is true of every time and
place, independently of our experience. This is a neat
example of proving the universality of a principle by
assuming it. It is usual to call this form of fallacy,
when committed in a single step of inference, a ixrrepov
Trpbrepov (Jiysteron proteron) ;
when the assumption and
1
Logic, Bk. III. ch. xxi. 3. The italics are mine.