An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

AND THE LAWS OF THOUGHT. 33
but the connotation of the term can never be used to
signify anything more than what we actually know.
8. We have now to examine the question, whether
term has both connotation and denotation. 1
every
We saw in 2 that some terms at least have both
kinds of meaning. The denotation consists of the
particular instances to which the term is applicable.
The connotation is the general idea of the attributes
which are exemplified in the particular instances. The
connotation is logically the primary meaning, the denota
tion is the secondary ; for if we wish to refer to objects,
otherwise than by pointing with the finger, we must do
it by means of the connotation of their name ; the
connotation determines the denotation ; and when we
are asked to
"
define
"
a term, we know that we are to
explain its connotation. This is fully admitted by Mill ;
for although he says that the term
"
signifies the subjects
[its denotation] directly, the attributes indirectly," he
does not mean that the fact has any logical significance*
It is not always a fact ; and when it is so, it is because
we have no sufficiently exact ideas corresponding to
many of the terms which we use, and so find it easier
to think in denotation. Here we have a psychological
fact, which is logically a serious defect of thought.
Now from 6 we see that not only some but all
terms have the two kinds of : meaning every name has
a primary meaning, the universal, the connotation, the
intension, or content ; and it also refers to actual or
possible instances of the content.
This terminology has unfortunately been reversed by
Mill. He divides terms into
"
connotative
: but he means by a
"
"
"
connotative and non-
"
"
connotative term,
1
This discussion has special reference to Mill s views, as set forth
in Book I. ch. ii. 5 of his Logic.
C