An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

34
THE NAME, THE TERM, THE CONCEPT,
"
one which denotes a subject, and implies an attribute,"
as all common terms do ; while a non-connotative term
is "one which signifies a subject only, or an attribute
only."
He then proceeds to argue that proper names and
"
non-connotative," since the former
abstract names are
signify subjects only, the latter attributes only. But the
whole question, which is thus raised, has been thrown
into confusion by the ambiguity of the word "connota-
"
tive ; for Mill uses it of terms whose primary meaning
terms which
is denotative, in our sense of the word;
denote a subject and imply an attribute. This use of
the word
"
"
connotative is a revival of a scholastic use, 1
which should be remembered only to be avoided. Dr
Fowler adopts Mill s view as to abstract and proper
names ; but his terminology is consistent with that
which we have already explained. He divides terms
thus : (a)
those which are both connotative and denota
tive ; (b) those which are connotative only (called by
Mill
"
non-connotative
"
i.e., abstract terms) ; (c) those
which are denotative only (called by Mill
"
tative
i.e., proper names).
"
non-conno
is this : whether
Practically, therefore, the question
names of attributes as such have connotation without
denotation, and whether proper names have denotation
without connotation. Let us take the former case first.
It is said that a name such as "colour," signifying a
mere attribute, has no denotation. But as long as we
consider a term by itself, in detachment from a proposi
tion, we cannot see what is really involved in its mean
ing. When considered in its place in a proposition,
the name of an attribute expresses substantiation of the
attribute ; the abstract is transformed into the concrete
(cf. 3). This is obvious when the term occurs in the
1 On this historical point, see Professor Minto s Logic, pp. 46, 47.