An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

36
THE NAME, THE TERM, THE CONCEPT,
qualities, to any one who hears it and is acquainted
with the person who bears it. But it is given not to
signify the qualities but to identify the individual.
Hence the question is, whether what is suggested by a
to what is
proper name does or does not correspond
meant by a common term or an ordinary singular term.
Mill and some others maintain that there is no analogy ;
there is a difference of function so complete as to justify
us in saying that proper names have
"
"
no signification
in the strict sense of the word. Against this, we main
tain that the proper name has no fixed or co?istant
but an acquired connotation. When used in a proposi
tion i.e., when used in the concrete as the designation
of a definite individual the name acquires meaning in
the strict sense, not merely "suggestions" or "associa
tions." The whole peculiarity of proper names consists
not in having no meaning, but in the fact that their use
(as the identification of a particular individual) prevents
the meaning from becoming general.
The main proof of our position consists in the fact
which Mr Bosanquet has pointed out (Essentials of
Logic, p. 92). "The convention of usage, which pre
vents a proper name from becoming general i.e., from
being cut loose and used simply for its meaning is
always on the point of breaking down." This actually
takes place when the meaning which a proper name
acquired^ while it was used as a designation for a par
ticular individual, is made general, and the name is used
as a type: "A Don Quixote," "a Daniel, a second
Daniel," "a
Solon," "a
Croesus," "a Nero," "a Caesar
Borgia." And as a matter of fact there are numerous
exceptions to the statement which we admitted, that a
proper name has no fixed meaning. Any name what
ever implies an existence of some kind ; and if we know