An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

FALLACIES. 327
the possibilities of error in sense-perception arise from
the fact that in perception things are not imaged in the
mind as in a mirror, the mind itself contributes to the
result. There is no perception without an element of
thought and inference^ although in simple cases (e.g., the
perception of a colour as red) we are scarcely conscious
of the inference. We need not dwell on this doctrine,
which is well established in modern psychology. The
more elaborate and systematic the observation is, the
more extensive is the work of thought in it. And it is
in -
this thought aspect of perception and observation
that the possibilities of truth and of error lie. Many
writers describe this source of error as "a confusion of
what we perceive and what we infer from what we per
ceive." This suggests that the perception and the in
ference are two separate things, which is not the case.
The confusion referred to is between the half-uncon
scious and instinctive inference, which experience has
that is a man "),
taught us to make correctly (e.g.,
"
the more deliberate and conscious inference, by which
we extend the former "that man is
(e.g.,
my friend
Smith often treat these "). secondary inferences as
We
and
if they were as trustworthy as the primary ones, which is
scarcely ever true.
(&) With regard to mistaken analogies, it must be
remembered that analogy is never strict proof; and,
as a rule, the conclusion of an argument from analogy
is only problematical. The real importance of analogy
is to suggest hypotheses and lines of inquiry. Hasty
and insufficient analogies may suggest unscientific and
even absurd hypotheses. Most primitive superstitions,
characteristic of the childhood of the race, are cases
of hypothesis resting on some fragment of analogy. This
fact is abundantly illustrated in the anthropological
writings of Tylor, Lubbock, and Clodd.