An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

340 THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE HAVE RAISED.
is the reference of a significant idea to a Subject in
Reality by means of an identity of content between
them. The "Subject
in Reality"
is the individual
thing (or things) of which we have spoken ; the
"identity of content" may be explained by
an ex
ample which Mr Bosanquet gives. "When I say,
This table is made of oak, the table is given in per
ception ;
. . . among
its qualities
it has a certain
grain and colour in the wood. I know the grain
and colour of oak-wood, and if they are the same
as those of the table, then the meaning
or content
made of oak coalesces with this point in reality ;
and ... I am able to say, This table is made of oak-
wood
"
(Essentials of Logic, p. 70). We have before
our mind, in perception or otherwise, a real subject,
about which we judge ; having also before our mind
a previously formed concept
which is identical with
certain features or aspects of the subject, we attach
it as predicate.
5. When we examine the relation of affirmative
to negative judgments (ch.
III. p. 52), we see that even
a negative judgment refers to reality, and implies that
reality is inconsistent with a suggested assertion.
Aristotle says emphatically,
"
There is one primary
assertive ^,0709,
affirmation ; then there is denial ;
"
"
affirmation is prior in thought to denial (De Int., c. 5,
An. Post., I. 25; cf. Poetics, c. 20). This states a
fact which will be evident on a little reflection. Nega
tive propositions have the function of simply averting
error. In real thought and speech we never make a
denial unless there has been some affirmation suggested,
imagined, or actually made, and we wish to deny it ;
and the reason why we deny it is that we believe
we have grounds for another assertion which is incom-
"