An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

FALLACIES. 319
which subsequent Latin writers gave the name of a dicto
secundum quid (777;) ad dictum simpliciter (aTrTuo?).
consists in assuming that what holds true in some partic
ular respect, or under some special circumstances, will
hold true without any restriction or as a general rule.
Aristotle, in speaking of this fallacy, refers chiefly to
illustrations of it which appear to deny the Law of Con
tradiction (ch. II. 12) ; thus, he says that we should be
committing this fallacy in arguing that an object which
is partly black and partly white is both white and not
white. It is only white in a certain respect (secundum
quid, 7777), not absolutely (simpliciter, aTrXco?).
The fallacy, which is a very common one, consists
essentially
"
in getting assent to a statement with a qual
ification, and then proceeding to argue as if it had been
conceded without We commit this fault
qualification."
if we prove that the syllogism is useless for a certain
purpose, and then claim to have proved
It
that it is useless
for any purpose. For another example : it is undoubtedly
true that to give to beggars promotes mendicancy and
causes evil ; but as Jevons says if we interpret this to
mean that assistance is never to be given to those who
solicit it, we fall into the fallacy under consideration "by
inferring of all who solicit alms what is only true of those
who solicit alms as a profession."
There is a converse form of this fallacy which is quite
as common, and consists in assuming that what holds
true as a general rule will hold true under some special
circumstances which may entirely alter the case.
"
For
example," says Professor Minto,
"
it being admitted that
culture is good, a disputant goes on to argue as if the
admission applied to some sort of culture in particular
scientific, aesthetic, philosophical, or moral." Fallacies
of this kind seek to argue a dicto simpliciter ad dictum