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An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

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THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE HAVE RAISED. 333<br />

would be expressed by the traditional Logic, as we have<br />

seen, in a syllogism <strong>of</strong> the form AAI<br />

Potassium is a metal,<br />

Potassium flo<strong>at</strong>s on w<strong>at</strong>er ;<br />

Therefore some metals flo<strong>at</strong> on w<strong>at</strong>er.<br />

Jevons remarks th<strong>at</strong> his own version <strong>of</strong> the argument<br />

does not omit in the conclusion a part <strong>of</strong> the premises<br />

i.e., the reference to Potassium ; but we must reply<br />

th<strong>at</strong> it does not give us the conclusion which is <strong>of</strong><br />

scientific value. This is true <strong>of</strong> many other instances<br />

<strong>of</strong> its<br />

1<br />

applic<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />

The equ<strong>at</strong>ional theory <strong>of</strong> judgment and reasoning will<br />

work, and therefore cannot be wholly false ; but it<br />

obscures the true n<strong>at</strong>ure <strong>of</strong> the judgment by making it<br />

a mere identity. We have shown (ch. IV.) th<strong>at</strong> if S and<br />

P are to be strictly identical, the judgment becomes an<br />

assertion <strong>of</strong> nothing, SP = SP, or a = a. There must be<br />

some difference between the meaning <strong>of</strong> S and th<strong>at</strong> <strong>of</strong> P,<br />

and therefore the judgment cannot be expressed in the<br />

form <strong>of</strong> an identical equ<strong>at</strong>ion. On the other hand, there<br />

must be some identity between the meanings <strong>of</strong> S and <strong>of</strong><br />

P, for the judgment, as Aristotle said, asserts th<strong>at</strong> they<br />

&quot;<br />

&quot;<br />

are in a sense one (De <strong>An</strong>ima, III. 6). In wh<strong>at</strong> sense<br />

are they one ? They may be one without being identical<br />

in the way in which the two sides <strong>of</strong> an equ<strong>at</strong>ion are so.<br />

The two meanings are one in the sense th<strong>at</strong> they are<br />

united in th<strong>at</strong> portion <strong>of</strong> the real world to which the<br />

judgment refers. Speaking broadly, wh<strong>at</strong> the judgment<br />

does is to distinguish S and P in intension, and unite<br />

them in extension. The judgment can combine unity<br />

1<br />

Jevons s<br />

&quot;<br />

&quot;<br />

equ<strong>at</strong>ional Logic is explained in his Principles <strong>of</strong><br />

Science, Introduction ; Studies in Deductive Logic ; and in The<br />

Substitution <strong>of</strong> Similars (reprinted in Pure Logic and other Minor<br />

Works ].

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