An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

34
THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE HAVE RAISED.
judgment," in its most abstract form,
still contains a
reference to reality, though not necessarily to any par
ticular objects in the real world. The more abstract it
becomes, the more it tends to take the hypothetical
form ; in that case as Mr Bradley says its truth lies
in its affirmation of the connection of the then with the
if; that is, the affirmation of the existence in reality
"
of such a general law as would, if we suppose some
conditions present, produce a certain result." Because
the hypothetical proposition "if S is M it is P" is
capable of the implication just mentioned, it is capable
of being used as a significant portion of scientific know
ledge (ch. VIII. i); in Aristotelian language,
it can
be used as a "major premise." But before we can
"draw a conclusion" from it, its general reference to
reality requires to be particularised, by being connected
with some actual case in space and time i.e., it re
quires
a "minor
premise." In the absence of this
particular reference, the judgment in its hypothetical
form gives us no information about anything in ex
be used
perience ; this is why the conditional form may
to express ignorance: "z/S is M it is P (but I do not
know whether it is M or But even not)." then the
ignorance is only about the particular case ; the positive
assertion of the general connection of P with M is
evidently implied.
Now, in the disjunctive judgment both these sides
can
(ch.
be detected, but both possess fuller significance
VII.
6). The particular reference is less in
determinate than in the hypothetical; and the general
implication is larger. "A is either B or C." "Even
if you do not know which of the two it
"
know that it must be one ?
is, how do you
Evidently we cannot make
such an assertion about A without knowing something