An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS AND JUDGMENTS. 103
attribute humanity." Mill s theory of Science is, that
it consists in finding when certain attributes become
evidence of certain others ; to establish such concomit
ances is the object of Science.
thus :
Propositions, so regarded, must be interpreted
in A,
" The attributes signified by S are always ac
companied by those signified by P "
in E, for
"
"
"
"
always substitute never ;
in I, ii ii "sometimes" ;
in O, M ii
;
"
sometimes not."
On this scheme we must observe that though Mill
proposes to drop the reference to "things," he is obliged
to introduce it again in other words. The words
"
al
ways,"
"
sometimes," &c., take us at once to instances
to which the name is applicable, to the objects in which
the intension is realised i.e., to the side of extension.
Just as propositions cannot be read in extension merely,
without any reference to attributes, so they cannot be
read in intension merely, without any
reference to
objects. In particular, it is not true to our thinking to
interpret the subject in intension only. Nevertheless
the attributive view is a possible way of regarding pro
positions, for certain purposes.
On the whole, then, we have justified the predicative
view as an interpretation of ordinary propositions.
"
In
saying, birds are warm-blooded, we neither think of
class within class, nor of attribute with attribute. The
word warm-blooded presents to us no conception of
a genus ; it is not a name, but a mere attributive. The
word bird expresses to us no attribute as such ;
it is
not a mere attributive, but a name. The term in the
predicate acts upon the mind by its connotation, or in
its
1
comprehension ; the term in the subject, by its
1 This term is occasionally used for "intension."