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An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

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2O2 CONDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AND<br />

The student will find th<strong>at</strong>, when the hypothetical is<br />

expressed as a c<strong>at</strong>egorical syllogism, the fallacy <strong>of</strong><br />

affirming the consequent appears as Undistributed<br />

Middle; and the fallacy <strong>of</strong> denying<br />

the antecedent<br />

appears as Illicit Major.<br />

Hamilton maintained th<strong>at</strong> the hypothetical proposi<br />

tion is not more complex than the ordinary one, and the<br />

syllogism may be expressed<br />

thus :<br />

If A is B, C is D ;<br />

Therefore, A being B, C is D.<br />

He considered th<strong>at</strong> the hypothetical syllogism is an<br />

immedi<strong>at</strong>e inference. It is true th<strong>at</strong> no new term is<br />

introduced in the minor premise ; but the major and<br />

the minor are distinct propositions, and the conclusion is<br />

the result not <strong>of</strong> either proposition by itself but only <strong>of</strong><br />

the two together. To say th<strong>at</strong> the conclusion could be<br />

obtained from either premise singly, is to misunderstand<br />

the whole n<strong>at</strong>ure and construction <strong>of</strong> the hypothetical<br />

syllogism.<br />

(a) The major premise affirms only th<strong>at</strong> the rel<strong>at</strong>ion<br />

<strong>of</strong> Reason and Consequence holds between two judg<br />

ments or concepts. It does not expressly refer to<br />

instances where the rel<strong>at</strong>ion actually occurs and about<br />

;<br />

any particular instance it tells us nothing <strong>at</strong> all. We<br />

may know th<strong>at</strong> A is<br />

&quot;if B, then C is without know<br />

D,&quot;<br />

ing th<strong>at</strong> &quot;A is B, therefore C is D.&quot; To say th<strong>at</strong> &quot;if<br />

the barometer falls, the we<strong>at</strong>her will be bad,&quot; is not the<br />

same thing as to say th<strong>at</strong> &quot;the barometer is falling, and<br />

so the we<strong>at</strong>her will be bad.&quot; But when, independently<br />

&quot; A is B,&quot;<br />

<strong>of</strong> the major, we know the truth <strong>of</strong> the minor,<br />

&quot;the barometer is falling,&quot; then we may<br />

assert the con<br />

clusion. <strong>An</strong>d we cannot assert it unless both premises<br />

are conceded ; th<strong>at</strong> is to say, the inference is medi<strong>at</strong>e.

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