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An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

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24<br />

THE NAME, THE TERM, THE CONCEPT,<br />

table, and the table is <strong>at</strong> once opposed <strong>at</strong> least to<br />

vacuity,<br />

if not to other articles <strong>of</strong> furniture. In this<br />

sense, every name is rel<strong>at</strong>ive. It is possible, however,<br />

to distinguish<br />

&quot;<br />

rel<strong>at</strong>ive<br />

&quot;<br />

names in a narrower sense, as<br />

Mill has done. &quot;A name is rel<strong>at</strong>ive, when over and<br />

above the object which it denotes, it implies the exist<br />

ence <strong>of</strong> another object deriving its denomin<strong>at</strong>ion from<br />

&quot;<br />

the same fact which is the ground <strong>of</strong> the first name<br />

:<br />

e.g., &quot;f<strong>at</strong>her, child,&quot; both terms implying the facts <strong>of</strong><br />

parentage; &quot;king, subject,&quot; both implying one <strong>of</strong> the<br />

modes <strong>of</strong> government. Such pairs <strong>of</strong> names are called<br />

correl<strong>at</strong>ives.<br />

6. Let us now characterise more precisely the kind<br />

<strong>of</strong> idea which we use in judgment.<br />

Why do we express our thoughts <strong>at</strong> all? Because<br />

thought forms a common ground in which different<br />

minds can meet, and which affords them a means <strong>of</strong><br />

mutual understanding. Every judgment gives informa<br />

tion ; it points outwards by means <strong>of</strong> language to other<br />

minds, to whom, actually or in imagin<strong>at</strong>ion, it is always<br />

addressed. Hence when we express a judgment in the<br />

form <strong>of</strong> a proposition, S is P, there are two conditions<br />

which the terms must fulfil :<br />

(a) Each term ought to have the same meaning for<br />

the mind using it, <strong>at</strong> one time, as it has <strong>at</strong> every other<br />

time ; otherwise it would not be the genuine identifica<br />

tion <strong>of</strong> a thought ;<br />

(b) Each term ought to have a meaning for other<br />

minds beside the one which judges, otherwise no infor<br />

m<strong>at</strong>ion is conveyed; and it ought to have identically<br />

the same meaning for all these various minds, for<br />

otherwise the inform<strong>at</strong>ion<br />

conveyed is confused or<br />

misunderstood.<br />

Thus we see th<strong>at</strong> the meaning <strong>of</strong> a term in judging,

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