An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

THE PROBLEMS WHICH WE HAVE RAISED. 347
times and places.
For this reason, the plural with
"
"
all
is not an adequate expression of the judgment; as it
does not rest upon enumeration, the sign of numerical
quantity should be dropped. The proper form is that
of the so-called indesignate judgment,
"
S is
"
P ; or,
to emphasise the necessity of the connection,
"
S must
be P." Sometimes the emphasis laid on the connection
of attributes is so strong that all reference to particular
things or instances may be dropped, and the judgment
assumes the conditional (hypothetical) form "if anything
is S it is P." This statement asserts only the reality of
the general law that the attributes of S necessarily in
volve those of P.
This distinction between collective and generic judg
ments was clearly explained by Aristotle in his Posterior
Analytics. The generic judgment he calls "universal"
(icaOokov) in the proper sense ;
the collective judgment
asserts merely what is common or generally applicable
to a group (KOIVOV or Kara Travros). "By universal
[i.e., universal predication] I mean what belongs to all,
and belongs essentially, and belongs to the thing as
such. It is plain, therefore, that all universals belong
necessarily to their subjects ; and to belong to a thing
essentially, and to belong to it as such, are the same.
For example, the triangle as such has its three interior
angles together equal to two right angles,
and these
angles together are essentially equal to two right angles.
The universal must hold of any thing of a certain kind,
and also of that kind first [i.e., of no kind constituting
a wider genus]." This is exactly the "generic" uni
versal, holding of any thing of a certain kind just be
cause the thing is of that kind and of no other (An.
Post., \. 4).
7. We have found that the "generic universal