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An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

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THE LOGICAL PROPOSITION. 57<br />

use the word &quot;may&quot; e.g.,<br />

if a person says &quot;Some<br />

Irishmen are not N<strong>at</strong>ionalists,&quot; he tells us th<strong>at</strong> any<br />

chance Irishman may not be a N<strong>at</strong>ionalist.<br />

&quot; Some S<br />

are not P&quot; means th<strong>at</strong> there is no inseparable con<br />

nection between S and P ;<br />

&quot;<br />

&quot;<br />

some S are P means th<strong>at</strong><br />

there is no incomp<strong>at</strong>ibility between S and P.<br />

We must distinguish the propositions<br />

&quot;<br />

S is not<br />

necessarily P,&quot; and &quot;S is necessarily not P&quot;<br />

impossible<br />

i.e., it is<br />

th<strong>at</strong> S should be P. The l<strong>at</strong>ter is an asser<br />

tion <strong>of</strong> impossibility, and <strong>of</strong> course forms an E pro<br />

position, as in<br />

&quot; The circumference <strong>of</strong> a circle is neces<br />

sarily not commensurable with its diameter.&quot; The<br />

former is merely a denial <strong>of</strong> necessity, as in &quot;A republic<br />

does not necessarily secure good government,&quot; or<br />

p<strong>at</strong>hs are not necessarily<br />

&quot;<br />

Old<br />

the best.&quot; The sense <strong>of</strong> these<br />

propositions is th<strong>at</strong> &quot;Some S is not P,&quot; &quot;Some republics<br />

do not secure good government,&quot; &quot;Some old p<strong>at</strong>hs are<br />

not the best.&quot;<br />

The last division <strong>of</strong> propositions which we need<br />

notice here is th<strong>at</strong> <strong>of</strong> verbal and real, also spoken <strong>of</strong><br />

as explic<strong>at</strong>ive and ampli<strong>at</strong>ive, or analytic and synthetic<br />

respectively. This distinction depends on the assumed<br />

fixity <strong>of</strong> definitions, to which we referred before (ch. II.<br />

7), and it is not applicable unless the fixed definitions<br />

<strong>of</strong> the terms concerned are actually known. The pro<br />

position S is P is analytic when P is the definition or<br />

part <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> S ;<br />

it is synthetic when P is<br />

not part <strong>of</strong> the definition <strong>of</strong> S. It is evident th<strong>at</strong> only<br />

when we have an accepted definition <strong>of</strong> the subject,<br />

can we tell whether the proposition is synthetic or not.<br />

<strong>An</strong>d owing to the very various amounts <strong>of</strong> knowledge<br />

possessed by different minds, a proposition may be<br />

analytic to one person, who knows the definition <strong>of</strong> the<br />

subject, and synthetic to another, who does not know

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