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An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

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IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS AND JUDGMENTS. Ill<br />

slightest use in helping men to reason correctly. The<br />

value <strong>at</strong>tached to them is merely an illustr<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />

bias <strong>of</strong> happy exercise<br />

&quot;<br />

(Logic, p. 134).<br />

Although the neg<strong>at</strong>ive interpret<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> propositions<br />

does not claim to be more than a mere convention, it is<br />

less <strong>of</strong> a convention than we are apt to think ; for when<br />

we make a universal proposition, All S is P, as the<br />

result <strong>of</strong> enumer<strong>at</strong>ing all the instances <strong>of</strong> S and finding<br />

th<strong>at</strong> &quot;without exception&quot; they are P, the proposition<br />

passes its meaning, so to speak, through a double ne<br />

g<strong>at</strong>ion. The proposition denies the exception ; and<br />

in such cases the formula nemo non or nullus non is<br />

the primitive formula, not a circumlocution. As the<br />

words<br />

&quot;<br />

&quot;<br />

without exception<br />

<strong>of</strong> the universal affirm<strong>at</strong>ive is<br />

imply, the primary meaning<br />

&quot; No S is other than P.&quot;<br />

Nevertheless, to adopt this convention <strong>of</strong> Symbolic<br />

Logic as the ordinary <strong>logic</strong>al<br />

doctrine <strong>of</strong> the inter<br />

pret<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> propositions, as Dr Keynes proposes to<br />

do, would be to depart far from ordinary forms and<br />

usages.<br />

6. The question which we now proceed to raise<br />

has been answered by implic<strong>at</strong>ion in the discussions <strong>of</strong><br />

2 and 3 ; but it is <strong>of</strong> such importance as to require<br />

independent tre<strong>at</strong>ment. Is the rel<strong>at</strong>ion, expressed in<br />

the proposition, a rel<strong>at</strong>ion between words only, or be<br />

tween ideas, or between things?<br />

No one is likely to assert the first. If the proposi<br />

tion were said to express a &quot;rel<strong>at</strong>ion between two<br />

names,&quot; all th<strong>at</strong> could be meant is th<strong>at</strong> it expressed a<br />

rel<strong>at</strong>ion between the ideas signified by the names.<br />

Every name must stand for some kind <strong>of</strong> meaning, or<br />

like Ham<br />

it would never be used. But writers who,<br />

ilton, take the conceptualist view <strong>of</strong> Logic i.e., try to<br />

keep Logic within a<br />

&quot;<br />

&quot;<br />

world <strong>of</strong> ideas<br />

without any out-

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