An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

42
THE NAME, THE TERM, THE CONCEPT,
If we find a thinker maintaining as essential parts of his
system the following doctrines : (i) we know, with the
highest degree of certainty, that the Reality which lies
behind the phenomena of mind and matter is unknowable,
and (2) we know with the highest degree of certainty that it
exists, that it is infinite, eternal, the Cause of all things, and
manifested in all things : then, by mere comparison of the
ideas employed, we see that the system is fundamentally
inconsistent. Reality is declared to be altogether unknow
able, and also to be knowable in certain important respects.
Both statements cannot be true.
If, again, we find it maintained that the "Association of
Ideas" is a law of connection among the units of which
the mind is composed, which are distinct "sensations";
that, by this law, a present sensation may revive another
one with which it was experienced at some former time, we
find the doctrine wrapt in inconsistencies when we ask,
"What happened to the second sensation in the interval
between its first experience and its revival?" Here the
mind is first declared to be only a series of sensations, each
of which disappears to give place to the next; then the
mind is declared to be such that a sensation when it
disappears can leave behind a permanent effect or trace
which can come up into consciousness. Both these views
cannot be true.
If, once more, a scientific man denounces with vigour the
assumption of a controlling designing Power at work in the
production of certain natural events, and yet allows himself
to speak as if "Nature" were a Power acting with a pur
pose, and is unconsciously influenced by this very idea in
his explanation of natural facts, then we may bring the same
charge. On the one hand it is maintained that no natural
effects are produced by a superhuman designing Power; and
on the other hand, that some effects are so produced.
"
"
The inconsistent doctrine or statement may always
be reduced to the one fundamental form, of attempting
" "
" "
to make the propositions A is B and A is not B
true together. In this form the principle is stated by
Aristotle (Metaphysics, IV. iii.) :
"
It is impossible that