An introductory text-book of logic - Mellone, Sydney - Rare Books at ...

230 THE GENERAL NATURE OK INDUCTION.
Thus the kind of inference which Aristotle calls
eTraycojrj, induction, is really deductive. In fact,
Aristotle does not regard this "induction" as a kind
of proof distinct from Deduction. All strict proof is
Deduction (cnroSeifys), and may be formally expressed
as a syllogism in fig.
i.
(a-vXkoyio-jjios Sta rov pecrov).
"
not
What Aristotle calls Induction is to parody Mill
a way in which we must reason, but a way in which we
may reason
"
to make things clearer : or 7n6a-
(^>j]\ovv
v(*)Tpov, a-a(f)(7Tpov Troietv)
to ourselves and others. 1
It is a mode of arranging a deductive argument so as
to enable us to realise, psychologically, the truth of the
general principle (apxtf) which is the real major premise,
a mode of illustrating the principle by bringing forward
instances. The word eTraywytj simply means
"
bringing
forward witnesses." 2 Of course, we cannot get "all"
the instances, except where the number is limited ; but
this fact does not vitiate an illustrative
as Aristotle had in view. 3
"
"
induction such
With the mediaeval logicians Induction became simply
a process of counting particular things ; and when we
have thus found by enumeration that each one has the
quality P, the Induction consists in concluding that
"they all are P." Thus we may prove by complete
enumeration that
"
all the months of the year have less
than thirty-two days," for the number of months is
limited, and so we can ascertain the fact in each par
ticular case before making the general statement. This
is perfect induction. But it usually happens that we
cannot go over all the particular cases, for some of
1 See An. Prior., ii. 23, 69 b 35 ; Top., i. 12, 105 a 16 ; and cf.
An. Post., i. 31.
2 Cf. Burnet, Ethics of Aristotle, p. xxxvii.
3 Cf. An. Post., i. 4, 73 b 33.