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JUDAICA - Wisdom In Torah

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england<br />

eral solemn events. The 50 th anniversary of the 1942 Wannsee<br />

Conference was the subject of an international conference in<br />

London organized principally by the Wiener Library. During<br />

1992 there were many celebrations of the Sephardi experience<br />

to mark the anniversary of the expulsion from Spain.<br />

[Vivian David Lipman and David Cesarani]<br />

Relations with Israel<br />

Britain’s relations with Israel should be viewed in the perspective<br />

of half a century, beginning with the closing phases<br />

of World War I. <strong>In</strong> November 1917, with the war against Germany<br />

and her allies still at its height, the British government<br />

issued a statement of policy, the *Balfour Declaration, favoring<br />

the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.<br />

The near euphoria and sense of gratitude to Britain that this<br />

announcement aroused among Jews everywhere was to give<br />

way a generation later to an atmosphere of bitterness and<br />

mutual recrimination, in which the British Mandate over<br />

Palestine finally came to an end (1948). But in the intervening<br />

years, despite all the frictions and difficulties, the foundations<br />

of Jewish statehood had in fact been laid. The period<br />

immediately following Israel’s Declaration of <strong>In</strong>dependence<br />

in May 1948 was a somber one in the relations between the<br />

new state and the former mandatory power. Unlike the United<br />

States and the Soviet Union, Britain refused to recognize the<br />

newly established state for many months. At the United Nations<br />

General Assembly in Paris in the latter part of 1948, the<br />

British delegation was the principal, though ultimately unsuccessful,<br />

protagonist of the so-called *Bernadotte Plan, a central<br />

feature of which was the proposal to transfer the Negev<br />

from Israel to the Arabs. Relations between Britain and what<br />

it termed “the Jewish authorities in Tel Aviv” reached an acute<br />

point when, on Jan. 7, 1949, in the course of renewed fighting<br />

between Israel and Egypt, the Israelis shot down five British<br />

planes that had been sent on a reconnaissance mission from<br />

the Suez Canal Zone. At this time, however, a strong reaction<br />

against the policy of Foreign Secretary Ernest *Bevin began to<br />

assert itself in Britain. The debate in the House of Commons<br />

on January 28 was a damaging one to the government. Three<br />

days later Bevin announced the de facto recognition of Israel<br />

and, shortly thereafter, the appointment of Britain’s first diplomatic<br />

representative to Israel, Sir Knox Helm.<br />

Gradually a new pattern of relations evolved between the<br />

two countries. The period of Bevin’s influence had not been<br />

forgotten by the people of Israel, but Britain’s initial role in<br />

having made the development of Jewish nationhood in Palestine<br />

politically and physically possible was increasingly recalled<br />

and recognized. Steady progress was made in day-today<br />

contacts through trade, tourism, and cultural relations.<br />

But despite these positive developments, British policy toward<br />

Israel continued to be markedly reserved, for reasons connected<br />

with Britain’s interests and commitments in the Arab<br />

world. As late as 1955, the British government still harbored<br />

ideas about the transfer of at least a part of the Negev to Egypt.<br />

This attitude was reflected in Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s<br />

speech at the Guildhall on Nov. 9, 1955, in which he suggested<br />

a compromise on the frontiers set by the Partition Resolution<br />

of 1947 and those established under the Armistice Agreements<br />

as a way out of the Arab-Israel impasse. This proposal was<br />

unequivocally rejected by Israel and eventually abandoned.<br />

Less than a year later, Britain and Israel found themselves in<br />

unlikely association in military action against Egypt–Israel in<br />

Sinai, Britain in Suez. The events leading to this development<br />

were President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal on<br />

the one hand, and his active sponsorship of the fedayeen terror<br />

gangs, organized on Arab territory for acts of murder and<br />

sabotage within Israel, on the other.<br />

For more than a century, the preservation of Britain’s<br />

communications with <strong>In</strong>dia, the keystone of her empire, had<br />

been a dominant factor in Britain’s interest in the Middle East.<br />

<strong>In</strong> 1947, <strong>In</strong>dia achieved independence almost contemporaneously<br />

with Israel. The strategic and political implications of<br />

this event for Britain’s status in the world were not immediately<br />

obvious. Britain remained the paramount power in the<br />

Middle East with military bases in Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan,<br />

and with a vital financial stake in the ever-increasing oil wealth<br />

that was being uncovered not only in Iran but in the Arab<br />

lands bordering on the Gulf, including Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain,<br />

and the sheikhdoms. <strong>In</strong> the mid-1950s a revolutionary<br />

change occurred: the collapse of British power and prestige<br />

that accompanied the Suez debacle of 1956 was followed two<br />

years later by the murder of the king of Iraq and the lynching<br />

of his premier, Nuri Said, Britain’s faithful friend and ally.<br />

The last British base in the Arab Middle East other than one<br />

in Aden was now relinquished. By 1968, as Britain’s policy of<br />

withdrawal from direct military commitment to areas east<br />

of Suez began to be extended even to the Persian Gulf; Aden<br />

too was abandoned. Middle East oil, so vital to the European<br />

economy, continued to flow more or less uninterruptedly because<br />

of the mutual interests of the Arab governments on the<br />

one hand and of Western purchasers on the other. But the<br />

old power relationship, including its implications for Israel,<br />

had dissolved.<br />

Nevertheless, Britain’s role in the area in the 1960s must<br />

not be underestimated. As a great world financial and trading<br />

community, with the support of experienced and effective<br />

diplomats, Britain continued to exert extensive influence. The<br />

decline of Britain’s authority in the Arab world significantly<br />

affected British-Israel relations. Although the traditional sensitivity<br />

of the Foreign Office to possible Arab reactions persisted,<br />

a more relaxed, less inhibited attitude toward Israel<br />

began to assert itself. This was manifested not only in official<br />

contacts and public statements, but also in willingness to sell<br />

Israel such major items of military equipment as Centurion<br />

tanks, naval vessels, and submarines. Within the aggregate of<br />

Britain’s overseas trade, Israel occupied a modest but increasingly<br />

significant place in 1968. The total bilateral trade between<br />

the two countries in 1967 amounted to about $215,000,000, an<br />

increase of nearly 75% compared with 1957. <strong>In</strong> fact, the value<br />

of Britain’s exports to Israel exceeded that to any of the Arab<br />

430 ENCYCLOPAEDIA <strong>JUDAICA</strong>, Second Edition, Volume 6

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