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JUDAICA - Wisdom In Torah

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exempla of the rabbis<br />

the creditors, on the other. Justice Tirkel added that the alternative<br />

residence must also be appropriate in terms of the time<br />

that the debtor is able to stay there. Accordingly, if the debtor<br />

had been entitled to live his entire life in the apartment that<br />

he owned, he is entitled to an alternative arrangement that assure<br />

him a lifelong residence. This determination stems from<br />

the interpretation of the law in light of its purpose – namely,<br />

that it mandates the protection of the debtor’s basic living<br />

needs, as expressed in the prohibition against attaching part<br />

of a debtor’s salary, his clothing, beds, tools, etc. Judge Tirkel<br />

pointed out that this arrangement is based on ancient principles<br />

of social welfare within Jewish law: “No man shall take<br />

the mill or the upper millstone to pledge; for he takes a man’s<br />

life to pledge,” (Deut 24:6); and “And if he be a poor man, thou<br />

shall not sleep with his pledge, you shall surely return him the<br />

pledge when the sun goes down, that he may sleep in his garment”<br />

(Deut 24:12–13), these being concepts that continued to<br />

develop over generations. Justice Tal concurred with the opinions<br />

of Justices Strassbourg-Cohen and Turkel, but added that<br />

in certain cases, where “the debtor … lives in a house that he<br />

had built for himself with the money of others,” the verse “he<br />

who builds his house with unfairness and his upper chambers<br />

with injustice” (Jer 22:13) is applicable and he is not entitled<br />

to the same protection.<br />

Extensive use of Jewish law was made in this regard in<br />

a decision of the Petah Tikvah Magistrate’s Court regarding<br />

the imposition of liens on a debtor’s assets. The Court relied<br />

on the writings of the Rosh (Piskei Ha-Rosh, BK 1.5) and of<br />

Rabbi Israel Isserlein (Terumat ha-Deshen, §305), from which<br />

it emerged that, prior to imposing a temporary lien on assets<br />

in order to prevent the debtor from hiding them, there<br />

must also be proof of the grounds of the action, and it must<br />

be shown that there is a likelihood that the defendant will attempt<br />

to hide these assets. The reason is that the purpose of<br />

imposing a lien on the assets is not to punish the defendant,<br />

but to prevent a situation which would encumber enforcement<br />

of the judgment (Maharshal, Yam Shel Shlomo, BK 1.20;<br />

Civil Application 4804/02, NMC v. Ben Chalouche, Registrar<br />

Zvi Weitzmann). The same Court also discussed the issue of<br />

what situation is considered to be one that encumbers the<br />

execution of judgment and concluded, on the basis of Jewish<br />

legal sources (Sh. Ar., HM, 73.10; Shakh on Shulhan Arukh,<br />

op.cit.; Maharshal, op. cit.), that, in order to obtain temporary<br />

relief, it is necessary to prove an active attempt on the<br />

part of the defendant to conceal his assets and to frustrate<br />

the execution of a judgment, and it is not sufficient to prove<br />

his inability to discharge the debt. (Civil Application 2264/04,<br />

Rosenthal v. Shinterko).<br />

Another decision handed down by the same court,<br />

also dealing with liens, reviewed the developments in Jewish<br />

law regarding the ability to enter a debtor’s house to collect<br />

a debt, in accordance with the Perah decision, while taking<br />

care to maintain the debtor’s dignity and not to harm<br />

him. <strong>In</strong> light of this review, the Court examined the proper<br />

balance between the defendant’s rights and the plaintiff ’s<br />

rights, and the degree of harm that can legitimately be caused<br />

to the defendant in order to secure the plaintiff ’s rights<br />

(Civil Petition 2621/04, Shinterko v. Rosenthal, Judge Zvi<br />

Weitzmann).<br />

Regarding this matter, see also FF 24891/03, A.N. v. A.T.;<br />

Civil Application 743/02 G.A. v. G.A., regarding an injunction<br />

against leaving the country; Execution of Judgment File<br />

17-09642-96-8 – re foreclosure on a secured asset.<br />

Concerning the use of Jewish law, see also Civil Petition<br />

18702/02 Polaski v. Galaxy Electronics (Haifa District<br />

Court, Judge Yakovshvili), regarding an arrangement of the<br />

debtor’s assets and a lien on sacred objects; and 3403/01 Ziva<br />

v. Yaakov, 5761(1) PDM, 756 (Jerusalem District Court, Judge<br />

Moshe Drori), regarding the execution of an act without a<br />

signature of the creditor.)<br />

[Menachem Elon (2nd ed.)]<br />

Bibliography: M. Bloch, Die Civilprocess-Ordnung nach mosaiich-rabbinischen<br />

Rechte (1882), 90–106; Gulak, Yesodei, 107–9; 4<br />

(1922), 184–96; Gulak, Oẓar, 314–36; idem, Toledot ha-Mishpat be-Yisrael<br />

bi-Tekufat ha-Talmud, I (1939) (Ha-Hiyyuv ve-Shi’budav), 118–40;<br />

Herzog, <strong>In</strong>stit 1 (1936) 4f; 386; S.J. Zevin, in: Sinai, 3 (1938),55–71, 246;<br />

ET, 5 (1953), 92–132; 9 (1959), 143–55; B. Cohen, in: Louis Ginsberg<br />

Jubilee Volume (1945), 113–32, republished in his Jewish and Roman<br />

Law (1966), 159–78; addenda ibid. 772–75. Add. Bibliography:<br />

M. Elon, Kevod ha-Adam ve-Ḥeruto be-Darkei ha-Hoẓa’ah la-Po’al<br />

(2000), idem, Ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri (1988), I:105, 194, 486, 515, 535,<br />

601, 633; 2:885, 1284f; 3:1319, 1370f; idem, Jewish Law (1994), 1:117, 218;<br />

2:591, 627, 651f, 744, 784; 3:1079, 1533f., 1576, 1635; ibid., Jewish Law<br />

(Cases and Materials) (1999), 455–75; M. Elon and B. Lifshitz, Mafte’aḥ<br />

ha-She’elot ve-ha-Teshuvot shel Ḥakhmei Sefarad u-Ẓefon Afrikah<br />

(1986), (1), 89–103; B. Lifshitz and E. Shohetman, Mafte’aḥ ha-She’elot<br />

ve-ha-Teshuvot shel Ḥakhmei Ashkenaz, Ẓarefat ve-Italyah (1997),<br />

61–67.<br />

EXEMPLA OF THE RABBIS, a collection of more than 300<br />

Hebrew stories – the largest collection of its kind compiled in<br />

the Middle Ages – so entitled by M. Gaster, who discovered<br />

them in manuscript and published them (1924). Most of the<br />

stories, especially in the beginning of the book, are similar to,<br />

or identical with, those in the talmudic-midrashic literature,<br />

although in the latter part, there are some longer, more developed,<br />

stories, not found in the Talmud or Midrash. While the<br />

manuscript is undoubtedly of medieval times, Gaster maintains<br />

that the collection itself is a very early one, predating the<br />

Talmud. Furthermore, he tries to prove that for their stories<br />

the talmudic sages did not use oral sources, but rather a narrative<br />

Hebrew literature, of which the only extant specimen<br />

is this collection. This he concludes on the basis of the organization<br />

of the work in accordance with literary principles.<br />

No proof, however, exists for Gaster’s conclusions. It is much<br />

more logical to suppose that the compiler of the Exempla collected<br />

stories from the talmudic-midrashic literature, adding<br />

to them medieval stories, with which he became acquainted<br />

through oral or written sources. All this material he organized<br />

together according to strict literary principles. The existence<br />

of two other medieval compilations of this sort –*Mi-<br />

598 ENCYCLOPAEDIA <strong>JUDAICA</strong>, Second Edition, Volume 6

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