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JUDAICA - Wisdom In Torah

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evil eye<br />

wife” (moredet). The husband requested to summon her doctor<br />

as witness to her mental condition, but the latter conditioned<br />

his testimony on the wife’s agreement to waiving<br />

medical confidentiality, which the wife refused to do. The<br />

president of the Court, Rabbi Shlomo Goren, and Rabbi<br />

Mordechai Eliyahu both held that the suspicion regarding<br />

a mental impairment was firmly based and that the doctor<br />

should therefore be compelled to testify to the court. On<br />

the other hand, Rabbi Yosef Kafah ruled that the probative<br />

value of the doctor’s testimony was minimal, as he would only<br />

testify on her medical condition as it had been many years<br />

back. On the other hand, the testimony was liable to cause<br />

her serious damage, given that she was engaged in education<br />

and would be derided by her students. Rabbi Kafah<br />

therefore ruled that the doctor’s testimony should not be<br />

required.<br />

ACCEPTING EVIDENCE AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE<br />

TRIAL. The Mishnah (Sanhedrin 3:8) states that “whenever<br />

evidence is brought – it can contradict the ruling.” <strong>In</strong><br />

other words, after the trial’s conclusion, even if the obligation<br />

ruled upon was discharged, the ruling can be annulled<br />

if new evidence was brought before the court. <strong>In</strong> such<br />

a case, a new trial must be held. The tannaim (ibid.) disputed<br />

the issue of whether the Court can place a time limitation<br />

on the period during which a litigant can proffer<br />

new evidence. The law was decided according to R. Simeon<br />

b. Gamaliel – namely, that the court cannot impose a time<br />

limit on a litigant’s submission of new evidence which, irrespective<br />

of when it was submitted, will be accepted. A limitation<br />

on the submission of new evidence is only effective if<br />

the litigant himself declared that he has no further evidence;<br />

in such a case he is prevented from bringing further evidence<br />

at a later stage (Maimonides,Yad, Sanhedrin 7:6–9; Sh. Ar.,<br />

ḤM 20).<br />

[Menachem Elon (2nd ed.)]<br />

Bibliography: Z. Frankel, Der gerichtliche Beweis nach<br />

mosaisch-talmudischem Rechte (1846); J. Freudenthal, in: MGWJ, 9<br />

(1860), 161–75; N. Hirsch, in: Jeschurun, 12 (Ger., 1865/66), 80–88,<br />

109–22, 147–65, 249–58, 382–94; J. Klein, Das Gesetz ueber das gerichtliche<br />

Beweisverfahren nach mosaisch-thalmudischem Rechte (1885);<br />

Gulak, Yesodei, 4 (1922), passim; S. Assaf, Battei Din ve-Sidreihem<br />

(1924), 102ff.; S. Rosenbaum, in: Ha-Mishpat, 1 (1927), 280–90; S.<br />

Kaatz, in: Jeschurun, 15 (Ger., 1928), 89–98, 179–87; Z. Karl, in: Ha-<br />

Mishpat ha-Ivri, 3 (1928), 89–127; A. Gulak, Le-Ḥeker Toledot ha-<br />

Mishpat ha-Ivri bi-Tekufat ha-Talmud, 1 (Dinei Karka’ot, 1929), 66f.;<br />

D.M. Shohet, The Jewish Court in the Middle Ages (1931), 171–85 (contains<br />

bibliography); P. Dickstein, in: Ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri, 4 (1932/33),<br />

212–20; Herzog, <strong>In</strong>stitutions, 1 (1936), 233, 255ff., 367ff.; 2 (1939),<br />

185–8; ET, 1 (19513), 137–41; 2 (1949), 70f.; 3 (1951); 106–10; 4 (1952),<br />

199–208; 6 (1954), 85, 106, 705–14; 7 (1956), 290–5; 8 (1957), 404–44,<br />

609–23, 722–43; 9 (1959), 64–103, 156–7, 448–9, 722–46; 12 (1967),<br />

307–13; A. Karlin, in: Ha-Peraklit, 11 (1954/55), 49–57, 154–61, 247–54;<br />

12 (1955/56), 185–91; J. Ginzberg, Mishpatim le-Yisrael (1956), passim;<br />

S. Fischer, in: No’am, 2 (1959), 211–22; E.E. Urbach, in: Mazkeret…<br />

Herzog (1962), 395–7, 402–8; Jaeger, in: Recueils de la Société Jean<br />

Bodin, 16 (1965); Ch. S. Hefez, in: Mishpatim, 1 (1969), 67ff.; Elon,<br />

Mafte’aḥ, 279–302; J.S. Zuri, Mishpat ha-Talmud (1921), 38–64.<br />

Add. Bibliography: M. Elon, Ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri (1988), 1:<br />

423, 502–504, 649, 800f., 827; 3: 1377f., 1442, 1486f.; idem, Jewish<br />

Law (1994), 2:516, 610f., 803, 981f., 1013; 4: 1646f., 1715, 1767f.; idem,<br />

Jewish Law (Cases and Materials) (1999), 200ff; M. Elon and B. Lifshitz,<br />

Mafte’aḥ ha-She’elot ve-ha-Teshuvot shel Ḥakhmei Sefarad u-<br />

Ẓefon Afrikah (1986), 1:135–42; 2:440–47; B. Lifshitz and E. Shohetman,<br />

Mafte’aḥ ha-She’elot ve-ha-Teshuvot shel Ḥakhmei Ashkenaz,<br />

Ẓarefat ve-Italyah (1997), 90–91, 298–304; S. Albeck, Ha-Re’ayot<br />

de-Dinei ha-Talmud (1987); E. Shochetman, Seder ha-Din (1988),<br />

269–317; D. Frimer, “Kevi’at Abbahut al-yedei Bedikat Dam ba-Mishpat<br />

ha-Yisraeli u-va-Mishpat ha-Ivri,” in: Shenaton ha-Mishpat ha-Ivri,<br />

5 (5738), 219–42; Y. Ben Meir, “Re’ayot Nesibatiyyot ba-Mishpat ha-<br />

Ivri,” in: Dinei Yisrael, 18 (5755–5756); Y. Ungar and A. Rachnitz<br />

(eds.), Mishpatei Ereẓ, 2 (2004); I. Warhaftig, “Beirur Uvdot ba-Mishpat<br />

toch Pegi’a be-Ẓeni’ut ha-Perat,” in: Mishpatei Ereẓ, 2 (2004),<br />

220–21.<br />

EVIL EYE (Heb. ערָה ָ ןִיע, ַ ayin ha-ra; lit., “the eye of the evil”;<br />

Aram. אָׁ שי ּב ִ א ָניע, ֵ eina bisha), a widespread belief that some<br />

persons may produce malevolent effects on others by looking<br />

at them, based on the supposed power of some eyes to<br />

bewitch or harm by glance. <strong>In</strong> early Jewish literature the acceptance<br />

of the existence of the evil eye as fact precluded any<br />

theoretical explanation of this phenomenon and discussion<br />

of its origin. <strong>In</strong> post-talmudic literature, however, one of the<br />

following two explanations is generally found: (1) the evil eye<br />

contains the element of fire, and so spreads destruction (Judah<br />

Loew b. Bezalel (“Maharal”) in Netivot Olam, 107d); (2) the<br />

angry glance of a man’s eye calls into being an evil angel who<br />

takes vengeance on the cause of wrath (Manasseh Ben Israel in<br />

Nishmat Ḥayyim, 3:27; cf. Sefer Ḥasidim, ed. by J. Wistinetzki<br />

(19242), 242 no. 981).<br />

As both explanations imply magic, folk beliefs governing<br />

magic and countermagic are evidenced in beliefs connected<br />

with casting and averting the evil eye.<br />

Casting the Evil Eye<br />

Whereas a “good-eyed” person is generous and good-hearted,<br />

the “evil eye,” in biblical (cf. I Sam. 18:9; Prov. 28:22) and tannaitic<br />

(cf. Avot 2:9, 11; 5:13, 19) sources, denotes stinginess, selfishness,<br />

and jealousy; in the aggadah of Palestinian amoraim<br />

the evil eye is a prevalent motif. Furthermore, jealousy was<br />

linked with magic and with fatal consequences. Hence, talmudic<br />

and midrashic elaborations of biblical narratives represent<br />

Sarah as casting the evil eye on Hagar (Gen. R. 4.45:5), Joseph’s<br />

brothers on Joseph (ibid. 84:10), Og the giant on Jacob (Ber.<br />

54b). Likewise, the evil eye caused the breaking of the first tablets<br />

of the Law (Num. R. 12:4) and the death of Daniel’s three<br />

companions (Sanh. 93a).<br />

This magical power of the eye was not confined to biblical<br />

evildoers; folk heroes, regarded as sacred wonder-workers,<br />

were believed to have exercised it as well, but for benevolent<br />

purposes. So R. *Simeon b. Yoḥai transforms an evil person<br />

into “a heap of bones” by means of his magic endowment<br />

(Shab. 34a; PdRK ed. by S. Buber (1868), 90a–b), and, with<br />

a look, R. Johanan, the amora, kills a man who calumniated<br />

584 ENCYCLOPAEDIA <strong>JUDAICA</strong>, Second Edition, Volume 6

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