CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY DAREN BOWYER JUST WAR DOCTRINE

Still, there is no denying that the Americans are very unpopular in Iraq. There is
one good reason for that unpopularity, which is that they have failed to
discharge the first duty of an occupying force: to provide, and maintain, law,
order and stability. … …
The Americans have not been able to establish the rule of law because they
simply do not have the troops in Iraq to do the job. The Bush administration’s
estimates of how many men it would need to control Iraq once Saddam had been
dislodged were wildly wrong.
Consideration of historical data on post-conflict stabilisation also suggests that a
considerably greater proportion of peacekeepers to population is required. Again, a full
consideration of right intent might have informed the campaign planning process and
led to a more appropriate troop strength which, in turn, might have more quickly
stabilized the country post-conflict and prevented much of the on-going international
unease. As Luttwak concludes ‘(h)ad the Americans deployed troops in sufficient
numbers … they could have curtailed the problem posed by Sunni guerrilla violence.
The scale of the disorder now on show in parts of Iraq is a direct consequence of
President Bush’s misjudgement on that issue.’ 124*
Francis Fukuyama takes up the theme of gaining legitimacy through demonstrating right
intent and achieving positive results. Despite being regarded, and regarding himself, as
firmly in the neo-conservative camp of US foreign policy commentators, Fukuyama has
argued that the Bush Administration got the war in Iraq wrong. Speaking in August
2004, he stressed the importance of legitimacy. A key argument of his speech was
summarised thus, in The National Interest:
If other peoples believe that the American role in the world is legitimate, they
will cooperate. Certainly, global institutions such as the United Nations can be
corrupt or nonrepresentative, but seeking a mandate from the United Nations,
NATO or other international bodies can be a pragmatic way to form true,
meaningful coalitions. ….. (I)t is dangerous for the United States to assume that
when it acts others will automatically grant a seal of approval to any step taken
by Washington.
…..(L)egitimacy will be accorded to the extent that American actions lead to a
positive track record. But when things go wrong, as they have in Iraq – where
warnings from others about the difficulties of postwar reconstruction or doubts
* In part this stems from over-reliance on technology-dominance, which will be considered in Chapter 4.
106